

**War Financing in the Late-Medieval
Crown of Aragon
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Medieval soldiers would agree wholeheartedly with the political maxim which had grown hackneyed by the time of the Renaissance in its assertion that “money constitutes the sinews of war.”¹ Medieval sovereigns often came to the painful conclusion that warfare required only three things: “money, more money, and yet more money;”² they would also agree that of all the costs a ruler might run up war was “the...arch-point of [state] expenses” and that its predictable end was the inexorable “increase in taxes.”³ To explore in very specific terms how these realities were managed by and simultaneously affected medieval sovereigns, this paper will focus on the family of realms of eastern Spain known as the Crown of Aragon during one of the longest and most expensive conflicts of its history known by later historians as the War of the Two Pedros

¹J.R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620* (Baltimore, 1985), 232.

²Ibid., 232; I.A.A. Thompson, “‘Money, Money, and Yet More Money_’ Finance, the Fiscal-State, and the Military Revolution: Spain 1500-1650,” in *Military Revolution Debate*, 273-74.

³Hale, *War*, 232; Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York, 1994), 14.

(1356-1366).⁴

I.

⁴For the Crown of Aragon, see, T.N. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown of Aragon. A Short History* (Oxford, 1986); Donald J. Kagay, “The Institutional Blue Print of a Crusader Land: The Case of the Medieval Crown of Aragon,” *The Journal of the Georgia Association of Historians* 24 (2003): 25-60; Joan Reglá, *Introducció a la historia de la Corona de Aragón* (Palma, 1973). For War of the Two Pedros, see Antonio Gutiérrez de Velasco, “La conquista de Tarazona en la Guerra de los Dos Pedros (Año 1357),” *Cuadernos de la Historia Jeronimo Zurita [CHJZ]* 10-11 (1960): 69-98; idem, “Las fortalezas aragonesas ante la gran ofensiva castellana en la Guerra de los Dos Pedros,” *CHJZ* 12-13 (1961): 7-39; idem, “La contraofensiva aragonesa in la Guerra de los Dos Pedros: Actitud militar y diplomática de Pedro IV el Ceremonoso (años 1358 a 1362),” *CHJZ*, 14-15 (1962): 7-30; María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “La frontera meridional valenciana durant la guerra amb Castella dita dos Peres,” in *Pere el Cerimoniós I la seva època*, ed. María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol (Barcelona, 1989), 245-357.

As early as the twelfth century, the fiscal exigencies of war acted as a powerful catalyst for the development of treasuries across Europe. In the Low Countries, England, and France, body servants to the sovereign inexorably took on a wider public role as collectors of war taxes and finally as members of an emerging treasury.⁵ As conflicts became more extended and costly in the late-thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, treasury officials in both England and France grew expert in squeezing taxes and subsidies from increasingly restive populations—all in the name of the “evident necessity” and “common good” of the realm.⁶ After several decades of growing royal insolvency and desperate bureaucratic efforts to address it, all sources of war funding began to dry up in a firestorm of opposition from many different groups, caused by lengthening episodes of warfare. Far from totally rejecting the expensive martial policies of their sovereigns, the English Parliament and French Estates General, distrusting royal officialdom, began to assert their rights to control the fiscal course of such conflicts.⁷

⁵Bryce Lyon and A. E. Verhulst, *Medieval Finance: A Comparison of Financial Institutions in Northwestern Europe* (Providence, R.I., 1967), 36, 47, 56.

⁶For these terms, see M.S. Kempshall, *The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought* (Oxford, 1999), 179, 187, 249-61; Kenneth Pennington, *The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition* (Berkeley, 1993), 232-37; Joseph Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300-1450* (London, 1996), 112-3, 128-30, 166.

⁷Ibid., 59; John Bell Hennemann, *Royal Taxation in Fourteenth Century France: The Development of War Financing 1322-1356* (Princeton, N.J., 1971), 5-10, 126, 155-56, 250, 285-86, 292, 322-3; idem, "Financing the Hundred Years' War: Royal Taxation in France in 1340," *Speculum* 42 (1967): 15-43; J. Russell Major, *Representative Government in Early Modern France* (New Haven, Conn., 1980), 14-17; G.L. Harriss, *King, Parliament, and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369* (Oxford, 1975), 231-69; Chris Given-Wilson, *The Royal Household and the King's Affinity: Service, Politics, and Finance in England 1360-1413* (New Haven, Conn., 1986), 121-30.

The global cost of the decades of fighting associated with the Hundred Years War has been estimated at over £8,000,000 for England and at a much higher level for the French.⁸ Despite the fiscal creativity and ruthlessness royal officials in both states utilized to rake money into the overburdened treasuries of their sovereigns. The bottom line was more favorable to the English, however, because of strong monetary policies which monarchs down to Richard II (1377-1399) found difficult to overturn, despite a growing deficit.⁹ In France, Philip VI (1328-1350) and his immediate successors soon ran short of operating funds and turned to the intermittent devaluation of their principal coinage. This deleterious practice proved a mainstay for the French war effort despite the bitter complaints of churchmen, nobles, and merchants that they were being “reduced to poverty” from the wildly-fluctuating prices that closely

⁸K.B. McFarlane, “War, the Economy and Social Change: England and the Hundred Years War,” *Past and Present* 22 (Jul., 1962): 6; M.M. Postan, “The Costs of the Hundred Years’ War,” *Past and Present* 27 (Apr., 1964): 40; Richard Bean, “War and the Birth of the Nation State,” *Journal of Economic History* 33 (1973): 215-7. The estimate for French expenses can be as accurate as that of the English because of the many breaks in French accounts of the era and the great proliferation of tax collection areas. Following Bean’s assertion that medieval armies seldom cost more than one percent of governmental revenues, French armies of the Hundred Years War may not have consumed more than 20,000 *livres tournois* [l.t] per annum.

⁹Peter Spufford, *Money and its Use in Medieval Europe* (Cambridge, 1988), 295; Given-Wilson, *Royal Household*, 113. One of the greatest complaints against Richard was “was the great and excessive costs of the court.”

followed the debasement.¹⁰

The same forces of increasing administrative efficiency and professionalism pitted against mounting costs and unwise monetary policies would hold sway far from the heartlands of the Hundred Years War in the Iberian Peninsula.

II.

¹⁰Spufford, *Money*, 276, 300-1, 305-6; Hennemann, *Royal Taxation*, 355-57; Henry Miskimin, *Money, Prices, and Foreign Exchange in Fourteenth Century France* (New Haven, Conn., 1963).

In the 150 years before the great Castilian war of the mid-fourteenth century, both the central and fiscal administration of the Crown of Aragon steadily grew more complex and separate from the royal household. To protect and merge his scattered political and financial interests, sovereigns, such as the great warrior king, Jaume I (1213-1276), utilized members of the royal family as “lieutenants” (*locumtenentes*) and also endowed several skilled, Jewish servitors with the office of “bailiff” (*baiulus, batlle*).¹¹ Associated with the Templars from his earliest days as king, Jaume relied on the order for long-term revenue management and short-term loans when martial emergencies loomed.¹² Much of the king’s fiscal planning was underpinned by a kind of “crisis financing,” consisting of a stream of loans from the king’s barons and prelates

¹¹Donald J. Kagay, “Administration, Central, Aragon-Catalonia,” in *Medieval Iberia: An Encyclopedia*, ed. E. Michael Gerli (New York, 2003), 214; Rober I. Burns, S.J., *Medieval Colonialism: Postcrusade Exploitation of Islamic Valencia* (Princeton, N.J., 1975), 274-75; J. Lee Shneidman, *The Rise of the Aragonese-Catalan Empire 1200-1350*, 2 vols., (New York, 1970), 2:471-75; Jesús Lalinde Abadía, *La gobernación general en la Corona de Aragón* (Madrid/Zaragoza, 1963), 24-40; J.N. Hillgarth, “The Royal Accounts of the Crown of Aragon,” in *Spain and the Mediterranean in the Later Middle Ages: Studies in Political and Intellectual History* (Aldershot, Hampshire, 2003), study III, 5.

¹²Thomas N. Bisson, “Las finanzas del joven Jaume I (1213-1228),” in *X Congreso de historia de la corona de Aragón [XCHCA] (Jaume X y su época)* (Zaragoza, 1975), *Comunicaciones* 1-2, 170-75. For Templar banking, see Alan Forey, *The Military Orders from the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries* (Toronto, 1991), 114-6; *The Templars*, ed. Malcolm Barber and Keith Bate (Manchester, 2002), 14-15.

who were paid back from future tax revenues. These monies were converted into pensions (*violaris*) and annuities (*censals mort*) in the newly-conquered lands of Valencia and the Balearics as well as among the Aragonese and Valencian urban populations.¹³

¹³Burns, *Medieval Colonialism*, 221, 237-40; Max Turull, “Finances i fiscalitat municipals a Catalunya durant la baixa edat mitjana,” *L’Avenç* 133-43 (1990): 62; Manuel Sánchez Martínez, Pere Orti Gost, Max Turull Rubinat, “La genesis de la fiscalidad municipal en Cataluña,” *Revista d’Història Medieval* 7 (1996): 115-34.

The next stage of eastern Spanish, fiscal development was ushered in with the reign of Pere II (1276-1285) and his immediate successors. Adapting the efficient accounting methods of his new Sicilian realm, Pere also imported into the Crown of Aragon such new fiscal offices as the “scribe of accounts” (*escrivá de ració*) and the “master of accounts” (*maestre racional*).¹⁴ Bringing new accounting and banking methods to eastern Spain, these officials also incurred such discontent that Alfons II (1285-1292) found it expedient to discontinue the Sicilian innovations. He then restored the power of the “treasurer” (*tresorer*).¹⁵ With the increased volume of royal revenues and the accession of Jaume II (1291-1327), a new sovereign fresh from the rule of the politically sophisticated realm of Sicily, the *maestre racional* reappeared in royal government, again sharing power with the treasurer.¹⁶ To attain the necessary modernization of the rather

¹⁴Arxiu de la corona d’Aragó [ACA], Cancillería real, R. 1529, ff. 4v-5; Kagay, “Administration,” 15; Marta Vanlandingham, *Transforming the State: King, Court, and Political Culture in the Realms of Aragon (1213-1387)* (Leiden, 2002), 208-9; Tomás de Montagut i Estragués, *El maestre racional a la Corona d’Aragó (1283-1419)*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1987), 1:44-46, 62-67.

¹⁵ACA, Cancillería real, R. 74, ff. 98, 102; Vanlandingham, *Transforming*, 216-9

¹⁶Luis G. de Valdeavellano, *Curso de Historia de las Instituciones españolas. De los orígenes al final de la Edad Media* (Madrid, 1982), 594-95; J.E. Martínez Ferrando, “Jaume II,” in *Els descendents de Pere el Gran* (1954; reprint, Barcelona, 1980), 61-62; Denis Mack Smith, *Medieval Sicily 800-1713* (New York, 1968), 77-78; Enrique Cruselles,

haphazard fiscal administration he had inherited, Jaume was thus forced to marry a “new financial superstructure” to the older forms.¹⁷

El maestro racional: función política administrativo del oficio público (Valencia, 1989).

¹⁷Hillgarth, “Royal Accounts,” 5.

With the reign of the cautious Aragonese monarch, Pere III (1336-1387), officials found their duties laid out in minute detail in the *Ordenacions* (1344), a simplified version of the Majorcan household guide, the *Leges Palatinae*.¹⁸ In this careful expression of governmental protocol, the *maestre racional* emerges as a kind of fiscal manager who audited the books of bailiffs and other curial officials, established the assessment rate for all imposts, and received the vouchers, receipts, and other fiscal paper work of subordinate officials, eventually incorporating all these records into a set of general accounts.¹⁹ A commission of 1348 gives a clear idea of the *maestre racional*'s duties. It enjoined the official to “demand and receive” all money owed the

¹⁸James III, King of Majorca, *Leges Palatinae*, (facsimile edition), ed. José J. de Olañeta (Palma de Mallorca, 1994); Thomas N. Bisson, “Statebuilding in the Medieval Crown of Aragon,” in *XV congrés d’història de la corona d’Aragó (El poder real en la Corona de Aragó, Siglos XIV-XVI)* [XV CHCA], 5 vols. (Zaragoza, 1993), 1:148; Hillgarth, “Royal Accounts,” 6; Montagut i Estragués, 1:79-80, 120-24.

¹⁹“Ordenacions fetes per lo molt alt senyor En Pere Perç rey d’Aragó sopra lo regiment de tots los officials de la sua cort,” in *Colección de documentos inéditos del archivo general de la corona de Aragón [CDACA]*, ed. Próspero de Bofarull y Moscaró, 41 vols (Barcelona, 1847-1910), 5:150-55, 161-62. For full discussion of late-medieval, Iberian courts, see Rita Costa Gomes, *The Making of a Court Society: Kings and Nobles in Late Medieval Portugal*, trans. Alison Aiken (Cambridge, 2003), 27-30; J. Jordán de Urríz y Azara, “Las Ordenaciones de la Corte Aragonesa en los siglos XIII y XIV,” *Boletín de la Real Académica de Buenas Letras de Barcelona* 13 (1913): 220-29, 284-92.

crown and to pay all sums of money which he was directed to by the sovereign.²⁰ The treasurer, who maintained the bulk of royal funds, made disbursements for both subjects and officials whom the Crown owed money.²¹ The scribe of accounts, the treasury's agent in the field, was responsible for tax collection and the settlement of royal debts on the local level.²² Pere lavished a great deal of care on spelling out the duties of his fiscal officials so his household and, by extension, his government would be "wisely arranged in all things."²³

III.

In some ways, the curial and governmental officials of the medieval Crown of Aragon were organized along disciplinary lines not unlike armies of the time. At the commencement of their service, fiscal bureaucrats swore solemn oaths to reject favoritism and extortion while advancing the royal patrimony and maintaining the secrecy of court matters.²⁴ These same

²⁰ACA, Patrimonia real, Maestre Reacional, R. 642, ff. 317v-8; Hillgarth, "Royal Accounts," 8, n. 29.

²¹"Ordenacions," 158-59.

²²Ibid., 161-62.

²³Ibid., 149-50.

²⁴Ibid., 156, 159-60, 186-87.

promises bound officials even more when their master marched off to war and “lived under tents and pavilions.”²⁵ During these dangerous periods, the king’s officials were crucial not only as tax collectors and paymasters, but also as spies and trusted messengers to field commanders.²⁶

²⁵Ibid., 84.

²⁶Ibid, 163.

Royal government and its “financing on the fly” was often well-adapted to the exigencies of intermittent border warfare so common in most phases of the Spanish *reconquista*.²⁷ As Jaume I made the war on Islam almost continually between 1229 and 1244, however, fiscal officials were forced to one height of creativity and determination after another in making royal means fit military demands.²⁸

²⁷Derek W. Lomax, *The Reconquest of Spain* (London, 1978), 99-101; James F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal militias in the Central Middle Ages 1000-1284* (Berkeley, 1988), 102-4; Antonio Palomeque Torres, “Contribución al estudio del ejército en los estados de la reconquista,” *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español* 15 (1944): 319-41.

²⁸For Jaume’s own account of these conquests, see *The Book of Deeds of James I of Aragon* [BD], trans. Damian Smith and Helena Buffery (Aldershot, 2003), 69-282 (chaps.47-337).

Even though Jaume the Conqueror could rely on large feudal hosts from the clergy, nobility, and townsmen of his lands, these troops had to be supplied and, if kept in the field long enough, had to be paid a daily wage.²⁹ The fuel of government operations, the traditional revenues associated with clerical and urban institutions, were difficult to convert into the ready cash that lengthy military campaigns could not do without. To gain this readily-spendable income, Jaume occasionally auctioned off future revenues for a wholesale price.³⁰ As the reality of military service drew ever closer, royal officials could harvest a windfall of funds made in lieu of military service or as a fine for non-compliance with the king's military summons. Though providing ready money, these expedients shackled the king with the promise that he would not collect them again for a specified time.³¹ To fill the fiscal void for his army in the meantime,

²⁹Ibid., 154 (chap. 151); Donald J. Kagay, "Structures of Baronial Dissent and Revolt under James I (1213-76)," in *War, Government, and Society in the Medieval Crown of Aragon* (Aldershot, Hampshire, 2007), study VII, 64; idem, "Army Mobilization, Royal Administration, and the Realm in the Thirteenth-Century Crown of Aragon," in *Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages*, ed. P.E. Chevedden, D.J. Kagay, and P.G. Padilla, L. Simon, 2 vols., (Leiden, 1996), 100-1.

³⁰For traditional revenues of the Crown of Aragon, see *Rentas de la antigua Corona de Aragón*, ed. Manuel de Bofarull y de Sartorio in *CDACA*, vol. 39. For sale of revenues, see Christian Guilleré, "Les finances de la Corona d'Aragó," *L'Avenç* 133-143 (1990): 54-55; Bisson, "Finanzas," 186-88.

Jaume relied on long-term loans from foreign bankers and repeated “exactions” (*questiæ*) from the churchmen and townsmen as well as from Jewish and Muslim “communities” (*aljamas*) in his own realms.³² For larger subsidies such as the Catalan *bovatge* and Aragonese *monedaje*, the king

³¹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 23, ff. 8v-9, 70v; Cartas reales [Jaime I] (extra series), no. 64; Pergaminos de Jaime I, no. 1916; Kagay, “Army Mobilization,” 102.

³²ACA, Cartas reales [Jaime I], no. 61; Luis J. Fortun Perez de Ciriza, “Relaciones financieras entre Sancho el Fuerte y los monarcos de la Corona de Aragón,” in X CHCA, *Comunicaciones*, 3,4, y 5: 171-72; A.J. Forey, *The Templars in Corona de Aragon* (London, 1964), 350; Yitzak Baer, *A History of the Jews in Spain*, trans. Louis Schoffman,

had to grudgingly go before his parliaments (*cortes, corts*).³³ For a man of action like Jaume, this proved exceedingly unpleasant since the members of the *cortes* proved very penurious paymasters who larded every extraordinary grant with galling conditions, which often attempted to hem in royal power.³⁴

2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1961), 1:84-86; Kagay, "Army Mobilization," 102-3.

³³Jaume's parliaments dealing with war funding and other military matters were: Tortosa (1225), Barcelona (1228), Monzón (1232, 1236), Barcelona (1264), Zaragoza (1264), and Lerida (1272, 1275)

³⁴Jaume and his people commonly accepted the idea that "in such important matters as ...[war], it is necessary to celebrate the *Corts*." The king also knew full well that "the members of the *Corts* are generally divided whenever we ask for advice on a great matter because they cannot agree well" [*BD*, 286-87 (chaps 381-82)].

In spite of the steady escalation of military costs which had almost doubled over Jaume's lifetime,³⁵ the promise of rich Muslim plunder and the advancement of status made royal service appealing and somewhat lowered the expense of Jaume's armies which could number up to 15,000 men.³⁶ With the conquest and distribution of the riches of the Balearics and Valencia, plunder as an inducement for military support and service largely disappeared. To defray military costs and assure that his soldiers in the field were paid, Jaume increasingly had to admit, as he did in 1264, that without the *cortes* "the business of war could not be arranged."³⁷ Such cash wrangling from the recalcitrant members of the parliament was hardly Jaume's long suit. He complained that these assemblies were "generally divided in opinion... and could never be

³⁵ACA, Cancillería real, R. 20, ff. 342, 345; Kagay, "Army Mobilization," 104-5. For contemporary military costs, see Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford, 1990), 94-97; Michael Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (New Haven, Conn., 1996), 84-88.

³⁶For distribution of plunder, see *Repartamiento de Valencia*, ed. Próspero de Bofarull y Mascaró in *CDACA*, 11:143-656; *Repartamiento de Mallorca*, ed. Próspero de Bofarull y Mascaró in *CDACA*, 13:1-141. For estimates of Jaume's armies, see Alvaro Santamaria, "La expansion politico-militar de la Corona de Aragón bajo la dirección de Jaime I: Baleares," in *XCHCA, Ponencias*, 122-23.

³⁷*BD*, 286 (chap. 381).

made to agree.”³⁸ Even with a desperate need for money to support his armies, Jaume’s temper occasionally forced him to leave a *cortes* in high dudgeon “as much displeased as any lord ever was with his people.”³⁹

The difficulties Jaume the Conqueror would face in extracting war funds from his people presaged quite clearly the fiscal travails of his great-great grandson, Pere III (1336-1387), when caught in the vice of a bitter, decade-long border war with his Castilian arch-enemy (1350-1366/69).

IV.

³⁸Ibid., 287 (chap. 382).

³⁹Ibid., 288-89 (chap. 384).

Ironically, Jaume the Conqueror's "war machine," marked by continual fiscal, political, and military adaptations to gain its rock-solid military objectives, was largely recreated in Pere the Ceremonious's conflict against Castile. Even the theater of the struggle—the far western Aragonese frontier bounded by such cities as Calatayud, Teruel, and Tarazona and the southern Valencian borderland opposite Murcia—had long stood as zones of defense against Islam and witnessed some of Jaume's great victories against his Muslim neighbors.⁴⁰ The same land fought

⁴⁰Bonifacio Palacios Martin, "La frontera de Aragón con Castilla en la época de Jaime I," in *XCHCA, Comunicaciones* 1-2, 490-95; Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, "Sobre la evolución de las fronteras medievales hispánicas (siglos XI a XIV)," in *Identidad y representación en la España medieval (siglos XI-XIV)*, (Madrid, 2001), 17, 21-44; J.M. Lacarra de Miguel, "Acerca de las fronteras del Ebro (siglos VIII-XII)," *En la España Medieval* 1 (1980): 181-91..

over by Cross and Crescent would now form the tilting ground for two men of mediocre Christianity. These areas, which endured war for a full ten years, have been described by R.I. Burns as “a series of irrigated huertas and lively commercial cities set like a necklace of emeralds and pearls”⁴¹ around swaths of treeless badlands characterized by the unflappable, nineteenth-century traveler, Richard Ford, as some of “the bleakest and most inhospitable land in the whole of Spain.”⁴²

⁴¹Burns, *Medieval Colonialism*, 14.

⁴²Richard Ford, *A Hand-book for Travellers in Spain and Readers at Home*, ed. Ian Robertson, 3 vols. (1845; reprint, Carbondale, Ill., 1966), 2:606-7.

The origins of the Castilian war were as muddled and petty as its two major protagonists. After a century of sniping at each other over borders between Castile, Aragon, and Valencia, the encouragement of domestic rebellion across these fluid borderlands, and dynastic disagreements between the Aragonese and Castilian royal families which were often bound by marriage ties,⁴³ Castile and the Crown of Aragon commenced hostilities in 1356 for ostensibly unimportant reasons.⁴⁴ From a remarkable series of letters which Pere and Pedro exchanged in the first

⁴³M.T. Ferrer i Mallol, “ Causes i antecedents de la guerra dels dos Pedros,” *Boletín de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura* 43 (1987): 446-50; Joseph F. O’Callaghan, “Kings and Lords in Conflict in Late Thirteenth-Century Castile and Aragon,” *Iberia*, 2:117-38; Angeles Masiá de Ros, *Relación castellano-aragonesa desde Jaime II a Pedro el Ceremonioso*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1994) 1:56-72, 127-28.

⁴⁴The war commenced in late summer of 1356 when Francesç Perrellós, a Catalan privateer, captured two Italian merchantmen at Cadiz. The ships were under the protection of Genoa and their ally, Castile, Pedro I viewed the attack as a clear provocation. He demanded restitution from Perrellós’s overlord, Pere III, and when it was not immediately forthcoming, he broke feudal ties with Pere III which served as a declaration of war. Pere III of Catalonia (Pedro IV of Aragon), *Chronicle* [Pere III], trans. Mary Hillgarth, ed. J.N. Hillgarth, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1980), 2:495-96 (VI:3); Pedro López de Ayala, *Crónica de Pedro I de Castilla*, (*Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, 66), ed. Llaguno y Amírola, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1953), 1:473-74 (1357:7-8); Jerónimo Zurita y Castro, *Anales de la Corona de Aragon*, ed. Angel López Canellas (Zaragoza, 1967-1985), 4:292-93 (IX:i); María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “The Southern Valencian Frontier during the War of the Two Pedros,” in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2005), 76-77.

months of the war, it is obvious that the monarchs were motivated by deep-seated enmity and frustration. The self-images projected in these missives are crucial for understanding the psychological parameters in which the Castilian war was fought. Portraying himself as a friend of Aragon cruelly portrayed by its citizens, Pedro swore to avenge his honor no matter how long it took. Pere, on the other hand, comes across as an innocent bystander befuddled by the madness of the Castilian king's brutal over-reaction, but equally determined to defend his scattered lands from every Castilian threat.⁴⁵ The tone of these letters—offensive for Pedro and defensive for Pere—would determine the overall trend of the conflict for the next eight years. Pere's role as defender, though approved as intelligent by Papal and royal theorists of the time,⁴⁶ was clearly significant for the fiscal bind and subsequent administrative innovations it forced on

⁴⁵Pere III, 2:498-503 (VI:3-4); ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, ff. 12v-15v; Masía de Ros, *Relación*, 1:249-53.

⁴⁶Joseph R. Strayer, *Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History* (Princeton, N.J., 1971), 295-98; Donald J. Kagay, "The Defense of the Crown of Aragon during the War of the Two Pedros (1356-1366)," *The Journal of Military History*, 71 (2007): 11-34.

the king.

The surprising speed of Castilian attack in the first few months of the war induced Pere to name in great haste “frontier captains” (*frontalers*) who would rely on both feudal and paid levies.⁴⁷ The wages were divided into two classes—“heavy cavalry” (*caballo armado, cavall armat*) and “light cavalry” (*cavall alforrat, caballo desarmado*)—with the first rank drawing the highest pay.⁴⁸ Because of the difficulty of keeping these paid forces on the frontier indefinitely, Pere (at least in Catalonia) could call out troops under the auspices of *Princeps namque*, the national defense clause of the *Usatges of Barcelona*.⁴⁹ Though this expedient allowed the sovereign to mount a sizeable

⁴⁷ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, ff. 41v-42, 48v, 49v, 183v; R. 1383, f. 173; Donald J. Kagay, “A Shattered Circle: Eastern Spanish Fortifications and their Repair during the Calamitous Fourteenth Century,” in *War*, study III, 130.

⁴⁸ACA, Cancillería real, R. 20, ff. 342, 345; Kagay, “Army Mobilization,” 105; idem, “A Government Besieged by Conflict: The Parliament of Monzón (1362-1363) as Military Financier,” in *Hundred Years War*, 140-41.

⁴⁹*The Usatges of Barcelona: The Fundamental Law of Catalonia*, trans. Donald J. Kagay (Philadelphia, 1994), 80 (art 64); Donald J. Kagay, “The National Defense Clause and the Emergence of the Catalan State: *Princeps namque* Revisited,” in *Crusaders, Condottieri and Cannon: Medieval Warfare in Societies around the Mediterranean*, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2003), 57-100.

force which served for national duty rather than for pay, Pere soon found that such national defense contingents proved better consumers of supplies than warriors.⁵⁰ He thus called them out sparingly and only when more professional troops were not available.⁵¹ Without such feudal means of recruitment on a large scale, the beleaguered Aragonese king had no choice but to ferret out money from traditional, extraordinary, and hitherto-unheard of sources. His war aims were thus twofold: (1) to put men in the field to resist the ever-present threat of enemy incursion along his frontiers and (2) to find sufficient money to pay and supply these defenders.

V.

⁵⁰Manuel Sánchez Martínez, “The Invocation of *Princeps Namque* in 1368 and its Repercussions for the City of Barcelona,” in *Hundred Years War*, 297-328.

⁵¹For a list of the occasions on which Pere invoked *Princeps namque*, see ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1519, ff. 1-71, 72-73v; Kagay, “National Defense Clause,” 95-97.

The rapidity of the Castilian attacks in the fall of 1356 left the Aragonese king gasping for fiscal breath.⁵² Desperate to post garrisons in his exposed castles on the Aragonese and Valencian frontiers, Pere could long rely on the slow-moving revenue system that supported the Crown and its retainers who controlled castles.⁵³ Since the birth of both Aragon and Catalonia in the tenth and eleventh centuries, great and middling nobles had held castles as fiefs and were supposed to support their garrisons from the “castellany” (*castellania, castlania*)—a complex of rents and taxes paid by the surrounding populace to the castellan.⁵⁴ The castle revenues themselves, however, soon overshadowed the duty of castle and garrison maintenance.⁵⁵

⁵²For this confused period down to Pedro I’s conquest of the Aragonese town of Tarazona in 1357, see Gutiérrez de Velasco, “Conquista de Tarazona,” 83-89; Zurita, *Anales*, 4:309-17, 321-27 (IX:v-vii,ix-x).

⁵³For an early fourteenth-century list of these castle revenues, see *Rentas* in *CDACA*, 39:315-74.

⁵⁴Pierre Bonnassie, *From Slavery to Feudalism in South-Western Europe*, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge, 1991), 166, 178-79; Flocel Sabaté, “Les castlanies i la comissió reial de 1328,” in *Estudios sobre renta, fiscalidad y finanzas en la Cataluña bajomedieval*, ed. Manuel Sánchez Martínez (Barcelona, 1993), 177-241.

⁵⁵ACA, Cancillería real, R. 231, ff. 52-53; Cartas reales [Jaime II], no. 9300; María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “La Tinença a costum d’Espanya en els castells de la frontera meridional Valenciana (Segle XIV),” in *Miscel·lania de textos medievals* (Barcelona, 1988), 50-51, 58-59 (doc. 4, 15); *The Customs of Catalonia between Lords and Vassals by the Barcelona Canon, Pere Albert: A Practical Guide to Castle Feudalism in Medieval Spain*, trans. Donald J. Kagay (Tempe,

Because of this lapse of feudal defense, especially in areas where a Muslim threat had long before been eradicated, Pere, like many of his predecessors, could do nothing but pour ready cash into a military venture that left him inundated by a flood of “great and immense expenses.”⁵⁶

To pay off his mounting war bills, Pere time and again had to turn to the various classes or estates of eastern Spanish society for several different types of monetary grants. In the first weeks of the Castilian war, he managed to pressure individual churchmen, monasteries, military orders, and members of his Jewish and Muslim communities to make sizeable contributions “for the good of the commonwealth of our lands.”⁵⁷ In the same period, a number of knights made

Ariz., 2002), 13, 16-7 (arts.15, 18-19).

⁵⁶ACA, Cancillería real, R. 331, f. 46; *Documenta Selecta Mutuas Civitatis Arago-Cathalaunicae et Ecclesiae Relationes Illustrantia* [DS], ed. Joannes Vincke (Barcelona, 1936), 30-31 (doc. 58).

emergency loans to their cash-strapped sovereign, but there is little indication that these were ever repaid.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1149, f. 74v; R. 1327, f. 201; R. 1379, ff. 93r-v, 95v, 134.150v-51; R. 1380, ff. 109v-110,134; *DS*, 424-25, 431 (docs. 560, 566).

⁵⁸ACA, Cancillería real, R.. 1380, f. 44.

The widening military crisis of 1356-1357 soon consumed these small fonts of money and led the king to even more drastic measures. In February, 1357, he began pawning royal lands, a process that would continue throughout the war.⁵⁹ In April of the same year, Pere wrote to his “dear companion,” Queen Elionor, instructing her pawn her “banner and as many of her jewels” as it took to raise at least 50,000 *sous*.⁶⁰ Though not often forced to resort to such humiliating measures in his war with Castile, the Aragonese king had few compunctions about engaging in them when absolutely necessary. Thus, in 1364, when Pedro held Valencia under siege,⁶¹ Pere ordered that all the silver ornaments in the churches of the beleaguered city be pawned to pay the salary of the troops he had brought into the southern capital. “For the release of our conscience,” Pere insisted that his treasurer generate a thorough description of each ornament, presumably so they could be redeemed at some time in the future.⁶² Though these

⁵⁹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, f. 134.

⁶⁰ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1152, f. 172; *Documents Historichs Catalans del Segle XIV: Colecció de cartas familiars corresponents al regnats de Pere del Punyalet y Johan I [DHC]* (Barcelona, 1889), 59.

⁶¹For this crucial Valencian campaign, see Pere, III, 2:562-67 (VI:51-52); Zurita, *Anales*, 4:485-87, 499-504 (IX:li,liv).

⁶²ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1197, f. 184; *DHC*, 59-60. There is no record that this was ever done.

examples represented immediate fiscal emergencies for the Crown, Pere's over-all war effort put him under constant financial pressure that he could only assuage by selling royal properties (including towns) and the revenues they generated. This action which reduced royal rents and other operating funds by half during the Castilian war intensified the king's personal financial embarrassment.⁶³

⁶³Manuel Sánchez Martínez, *El naixement de la fiscalitat d'Estat a Catalunya (segles XII-XIV)* (Gerona, 1995), 85-87, 117; Hillgarth, "Royal Accounts," 12. For similar fiscal strategies in Habsburg Spain, see Helen Nader, *Liberty in Absolutist Spain: The Hapsburg Sale of Towns, 1516-1700* (Baltimore, 1990).

Despite these emergency measures, the Aragonese war expenses showed no signs of decreasing until the late spring of 1357 when the efforts of a Papal *nuncio* bore fruit with the arrangement of a truce between the warring parties.⁶⁴ When Pedro rapidly violated this instrument, the Aragonese king, suffering from growing insolvency, turned to more formal and general means of gaining operating funds for his armies.⁶⁵

⁶⁴Zurita, *Anales*, 4:324-32 (IX:x-xi); Ferrer i Mallol, *Southern Valencian Frontier*, 84-87.

⁶⁵For the question of the royal government's management of deficits before and during the Castilian war, see Christian Guilleré, "Les finances de la Courone d'Aragon au debut du XIV^e (1300-1310)," in *Estudios*, 493.

As the first phases of the Castilian war passed from one disaster to another for the Aragonese king, he came to the obvious conclusions that “his soldiers [could not] do their duty without money”⁶⁶ and that he himself would not be able “to sustain the burden of the war without the assistance of his subjects.”⁶⁷ To accomplish this aim in the short term, Pere resurrected a lucrative impost utilized by Jaume I, the *redemptio exercitus*, a one-time payment that allowed individuals or corporate groups to buy exemption from military service for a specified period.⁶⁸ He also began to privatize future royal revenues and taxes to his subjects by permitting clerical and urban authorities to sell them for a base price and for a specified period to individuals with the proviso that the money be used for paying military salaries or repairing fortifications.⁶⁹

With the mounting financial pressure the war placed on the urban, clerical, and infidel communities, tax re-distribution schemes proved ineffective for the tax middlemen and the Crown. Instead, both parties increasingly relied on fiscal negotiation on an ever wider scale. To

⁶⁶Pere III, 2:554 (VI:45).

⁶⁷ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1382, f. 104v.

⁶⁸ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1380, ff. 18v, 55v-56v, 57v, 97.

⁶⁹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, f. 25v; R. 1380, ff. 18, 136-37v; R. 1381, ff. 60-61; R. 1383, f. 208v.

accomplish this complex task, Pere appointed “commissioners” (*commissarii, comissaris*) from his court officials who would work out with the leaders of an entire group the parameters of a general “subsidy” (*subsidium*) or a “grant in aid of war” (*auxilium, auida, ayuda, proferta*). The commissioners would then oversee the collection of these funds and turn over the proceeds to treasury officials who would begin the process of distributing them to forces in the field. This process proved much more effective for the royal administration and was also preferred by the various groups since, in theory, the king could only claim such grants every few years.⁷⁰

VI.

⁷⁰ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1380, ff. 29, 76r-v, 96r-v, 100v, 178-79; R. 1382, f. 104v; R. 1383, ff. 209v-210v.

With the almost constant collection of war taxes across the Crown of Aragon in the first years of the Castilian war, a methodology, drawn from the operating principles of the offices of treasurer and *maestre racional*, was adapted to the pressing matter of finding funds for Pere's expansive war effort. In the case of a contribution of an individual or a single community to the war fund, Pere normally dispatched two or more of his court officials to levy the specified amount, properly docket the collected sum, and then transport the money back to the royal court where treasury officials or other extraordinary fiscal delegates would take charge of it.⁷¹ Since such operations were often conducted with town or village councils or clerical groups, these communal authorities were occasionally given some autonomy in laying out how the collection would be conducted and the installments in which taxes would be paid off.⁷²

⁷¹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, ff. 27v-28; R. 1381, f. 31; R. 1382, ff. 141v-42.

⁷²ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1380, ff. 46v-48, 112r-v; María Teresa Ainaga Andrés, "El fogaje aragonés de 1362: Aportación a la demografía de Zaragoza en el siglo XIV," *Aragón en la Edad Media* 8 (1989): 48-19 (doc. 1).

This simple model of court dominance of the process was firmly turned on its head when town councils, such as Perpignan, rejected limited fiscal autonomy and completely took over the raising of war funds. To meet royal quotas in 1359, the consuls of the royal village took it on themselves to sell off imposts and annuities for several years into the future. When the purchaser of these revenues moved to reimburse himself by collecting them, these traditional revenues applied to all property holders in Perpignan, even members of the royal family and great nobility. Even more shocking to the concept of royal order was the city council's insistence that all aspects of this tax collection operation would be under the supervision of the municipal authorities. What is more, royal officials would have nothing to do with the process until collected monies were turned over to treasury officials.⁷³ In reality, Perpignan rode a wave of fiscal autonomy that had already swept across the representative assemblies of the Crown of Aragon major states.

As the years of war passed and the sources of money in eastern Spain shrank, Pere could do little else but to respect, at least partially, the claims of some clerical and urban institutions.⁷⁴ By and large, however, he persistently attempted to maintain the system that emerged from the fiscal methods of his own government. To collect imposts from large groups of ratepayers, the

⁷³ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1383, ff. 58v-60.

⁷⁴ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1380, ff. 123r-v.

Crown utilized the same method that had proved effective with individuals: the appointment of commissioners with extensive power to collect tax at the level negotiated with the group authorities and then to transfer it to the royal treasury. These special agents of the king's war effort had "full power...to seek, demand, and receive" the imposts and could designate "suitable persons" to do the same.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1380, ff. 40v-41v.

While the tax rolls themselves were often woefully incomplete, the process by which taxes were gathered was a fairly efficient one and even provided an example for the fiscal activities of the Aragonese, Catalan, and Valencian parliaments for the next century-and-a-half.⁷⁶

The procedure used was as follows: the tax burden of each city, town, village, or hamlet, publicized in writing or by crier, was assessed on each “household” (*foch*). The resulting “household tax” (*fogatge*, *fogaje*) was an impost that held both families and communities responsible for fulfilling the tax levels assigned by the Crown.⁷⁷ It was also surprisingly flexible and allowed the tax commissioners to re-negotiate the household tax, even after the collection process had begun.⁷⁸ When “money...[was] very necessary” for the war effort, collection of the *fogatge* could be turned over to the urban community or clerical institution in return for small lump-sum payment in cash to be made immediately.⁷⁹

⁷⁶J.M. Pons Guri, “Un fogatjament desconegut de l’any 1358,” 30 (1963-64): 322-498; Ainaga Andrés, “Fogaje aragonés,” 33-59.

⁷⁷ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1380, f. 65; R. 1381, ff. 167r-v. For the similar French impost, the *fouage*, see Henneman, *Royal Taxation*, 4-5, 211-5, 255-59, 281-83.

⁷⁸ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, ff. 176r-v.

⁷⁹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, f. 152v.

Not all of Pere's tax-gathering ventures always went according to the written orders his commissioners used as both credentials and authorization. Depending on the ebb and flow of campaigns, tax collectors might be commanded to postpone their operations or to completely cancel them.⁸⁰ The curtailment of these operations was understandable when small hamlets and villages had been so destroyed by the constant Castilian raiding that their traditional populace deserted them. Commissioners, however, must have found royal orders to break off collections with the arrangement of a truce in 1357 and a peace treaty in 1361 particularly troubling in light of Pedro's penchant for violating these instruments.⁸¹

⁸⁰ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, f. 39v.

⁸¹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, ff. 35-36, 128, 131. The truce was accepted in May, 1357 and violated by Pedro in the spring of 1358; the peace of Terrer was concluded in May, 1361 and violated by Castilian attacks in summer, 1361.

One of the most unpredictable aspects of the tax collection process faced by Pere's commissioners was the level of general compliance or opposition to the extraordinary subsidies expressed by the taxed population. The king warned his agents against antagonizing the communities that fell under extraordinary tax burdens and especially against violating the privileges of clerical and noble lords who exercised suzerainty over many of the urban sites that were repeatedly called on to contribute to the war effort.⁸² Most of Pere's Christian subjects were given some time to pay their tax bills; many were even allowed to leave a small monetary "surety" (*securitas*) with the commissioners as a guaranty that they would pay their share into war chest at some time in the near future.⁸³ Royal officials could confiscate such bonds if the persons did not contribute to the war subsidy with a grace period of a few weeks.⁸⁴ After some months had passed, however, the names of those who had not completed their fiscal responsibilities had to be shared with the commissioners and with the entire community.⁸⁵ From their credentials, Pere's tax collectors were allowed to take legal action against recalcitrant

⁸²ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1380, ff. 59v-60, 104r-v.

⁸³ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1380, f. 84.

⁸⁴ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1383, f. 235v.

⁸⁵ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1382, f. 147.

taxpayers and were well within their rights in “compelling and distraining the persons and goods” of those who had avoided their patriotic duty of contributing to the war against Pedro.⁸⁶

The king even warned his subjects that failure to contribute to the subsidy was tantamount to treason since such actions evaded each citizen’s duty “to resist the iniquitous purpose of our enemy, the Castilian king” and, as a result, might “overturn the defense of the kingdom.”⁸⁷

Though the tax collectors could use legal methods to extort promised tax payments, the ever-cautious Pere was nervous about such legitimate initiatives and often warned his tax men: “refrain from acting until you have something ordered from us.”⁸⁸

⁸⁶ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1382, ff. 49v, 146; R. 1383, f. 44.

⁸⁷ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1382, ff. 153-54; R. 1383, ff. 216v-7.

⁸⁸ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1384, f. 3v.

Though based on the procedures of the royal treasury, the collection of war subsidies took on a life of its own which occasionally seemed to be transferring the entire process into near-anarchy. Commissioners and treasury officials were clearly required to issue “receipts” (*apochas, apocas*) to all ratepayers and then to enter these transactions in a special “account” (*compte*).⁸⁹ These records would prove crucial if the communities contributing to the subsidy decided to legally contest the actions of the Crown’s tax collectors.⁹⁰ Royal personnel involved in the war financing effort were also to keep careful records of all their operating expenses and salaries.⁹¹ The collected funds were then transferred to the royal treasury by the royal “messenger (*porter*) who swore homage and fealty “through mouth and hand” to faithfully carry out this crucial duty.⁹² At times, the king designated a special agent, usually a great “banker” or “money changer” (*cambiator*) to maintain “the great sums of money” generated from the subsidy and then make disbursements from this fund.⁹³ In both cases, the trail of tax money into royal

⁸⁹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, f. 192.

⁹⁰ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, f. 95.

⁹¹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1380, f. 84v; R. 1381, ff. 70r-v.

⁹²ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, ff. 174r-v.

coffers and from there to the frontier battle zones was supposed to be meticulously recorded. Pay vouchers (*albarani, albaras*) and “letters of credit” (*cartas de creença*) directed officials to pay the salaries of military units once their commanders produced a proper “muster list” (*mostra*).⁹⁴

⁹³ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1380, ff. 118v-9.

⁹⁴ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, ff. 123r-v, 181; R. 1383, ff. 221v-22v.

The fiscal operation that took place within the precincts of Pere's government because of the "great expenses and costs" that harried the Aragonese king for the entire decade of the Castilian war was both an adaptative and inefficient process.⁹⁵ From the collection of the extraordinary subsidy to the transport and storage of these funds to their ultimate distribution among the troops in the field, Pere's system of war financing was a monetary pipeline that leaked at every administrative connecting point of its journey. The clerical and urban authorities as well as the king's own fiscal servitors all had ample opportunity to engage in kickbacks, double billing, false accounting and other forms of malversation that eventually put most of the government of Pere's successor, Joan I (1387-1396), on trial for malfeasance.⁹⁶ Even military commanders had ample opportunity to enrich themselves from frontier service by maintaining

⁹⁵ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1383, ff. 245r-v.

⁹⁶Donald J. Kagay, "Poetry in the Dock: The Court Culture of Joan I on Trial (1396-1398)," in *War*, study XI, 66-67; Hillgarth, "Royal Accounts," 15.

the troop strength of their units below that specified in the muster list and happily pocketing salaries for troops that did not exist. They also fell into the habit of enriching themselves by holding back a portion of money intended for the salaries of the troops they did have.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, ff. 173r-v; R. 1382, f. 149v; R. 1383, ff. 221r-v, 243.

The passage of war finances through zones dominated by urban, clerical, and royal administrations necessarily made for an uncoordinated and unwieldy arrangement not unlike the governance structure of many an American university. Several examples of this jealous and overlapping ineptitude will be sufficient. In 1349, long before the War of the Two Pedros broke, Pere had sent a number of congratulatory embassies to the Castilian king, King Alfonso XI (1312-1350), the conqueror of the important Muslim port of Algeciras in 1344.⁹⁸ In the last of these in the late spring of 1349, the Aragonese sent a squadron of four ships commanded by his admiral, Ramón de Vilanova, and his principal adviser, Bernat de Cabrera, to aid Alfonso in defending the straits of Gibraltar against the threatened attack of the Muslim dynasty of Morocco, the Merinids.⁹⁹ To cover the expenses of this small naval force, the admiral was given a set fee by the royal treasurer. As often happened with military and naval expeditions, real costs exceeded administrative estimates. As a result, Vilanova had to pay out of his own pocket the extra 6,000 *sous* which the final campaigning bill came to and then wait to be reimbursed from the crown. Despite a number of attempts to recover this money, the admiral was unsuccessful

⁹⁸Nicolas Agrait, "The Experience of War in Fourteenth-Century Spain: Alfonso XI and the Capture of Algeciras (1342-1344)," in *Crusaders*, 213-38; idem, "The Reconquest during the Reign of Alfonso XI (1312-1350)," in *On the Social Origins of Medieval Institutions: Essays in Honor of Joseph F. O'Callaghan*, ed. Donald J. Kagay and Theresa M. Vann (Leiden, 1998), 157-62

⁹⁹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1134, f. 167; Masiá de Ros, *Relación* 1:239; 2:364-67 (docs. 196/35; 197/37).

until 1366, when, ironically, his royal master was a war with the son of the Castilian monarch he had set out to help so long before.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ACA, Patrimonio real, Maestre Racional, R. 644, ff. 255-56; Hillgarth, "Royal Accounts," 9, n. 33.

In 1359, at the height of the Castilian war, Miguel Pérez de Gotor, referred to as the “shieldbearer, esquire” (*scrutifer, escudero*), a scion of an old Aragonese baronial family with holdings along the Murcian frontier,¹⁰¹ served on the Aragonese frontier with a company of horsemen led by his father, Eximen Pérez de Gotor. During this tour of duty, Miguel lost a “roan” (*caballo de pelo runo*) from his string of war horses. The scribe of accounts set the worth of the animal, which may have been killed in action or stolen, at 800 Jacan *sous* and directed the representatives of the hamlets of Teruel to pay this amount since the animal died during the defense of these Aragonese frontier settlements.¹⁰² Carrying the pay voucher that documented his loss through his entire war service, Miguel spent much of the next year going through channels—all to no avail. After appealing to Aragon’s highest judicial authority, the *Justicia Major*, Juan López de Sesse, he “complained bitterly” to the king that he had not been reimbursed for his loss. Incensed, Pere demanded that the city fathers of Teruel’s hamlets accept his “remedy of justice” (*remedio justicie*) by paying Miguel the money owed him. Otherwise, Pere darkly promised them his “ire and indignation.” Pere issued this stern warning in June, 1360 (over a

¹⁰¹Pedro Garcés de Cariñena, *Nobilario de Aragón*, ed. María Isabel Ubieto Artur (Zaragoza, 1983), 103-5.

¹⁰²For such unitary actions of Aragonese hamlets, see Donald J. Kagay, “Two Towns Where There Was Once One: The *Aldea* in Medieval Aragon,” *Journal of the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association* 14 (1993): 40-41.

year after the loss of the horse), but its ultimate effect is not known.¹⁰³ What must have become painfully obvious to both Ramón de Vilanova and Miguel Pérez de Gotor, however, was the difficulty of getting of getting reimbursed from Pere's administration, whether functioning in war or peace.

VII.

As the Aragonese sovereign utilized his fiscal institutions old and new to squeeze every possible *son* out of his realms, the representative assemblies of the Crown of Aragon and the estates of its various lands grew increasingly restive especially since they had been supporting Pere's often-unsuccessful military endeavors for years before the conflict with Pedro I.¹⁰⁴ While Pere had managed to extract subsidies from clergy, nobles, and townsmen across eastern Spain in the first few months of the Castilian war, the pressing need for money forced the king to rely ever more heavily on the *curia generalis* [*corts* (Catalan); *cortes* (Aragonese, Castilian)], an institution

¹⁰³ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1382, ff. 138v-39.

¹⁰⁴Manuel Sánchez Martínez, "*Corts, parlaments* y fidalidad en Cataluña: Las 'profertes' para las guerras mediterraneas (1350-1356)," XV *CHCA, Comunicaciones*, 253-72.

he would grow to detest.

In 1357, when “the Castilian king had inflicted great damage on the kingdom of Aragon in capturing some castles and other fortresses,”¹⁰⁵ Pere frantically called together a *corts* at L rida to seek advise and help in regard to the worsening military situation he commanded. Though hoping that the Catalans would supply funds to staff his embattled frontier posts in Aragon and Valencia, he was quickly disappointed.¹⁰⁶ In August of the next year, the mounting expenses of another campaigning season forced Pere to call out another Catalan assembly—this time at Barcelona. He again harbored the hope that he might convince the Catalans to grant a general aid. After months of pointless wrangling, the members of the *corts* and the frustrated sovereign came to an agreement that obliged the estates of Catalonia to raise a subsidy that would pay military salaries for the next two years. Pere appointed four special tax commissioners to collect this money “in the manner of a *fogatge*” on all “castles, square towers and closed fortified places”

¹⁰⁵Jos -Luis Martin, “Las cortes catalanas en la Guerra Castellano-Aragonesa (1356-1365),” VIII *CHCA* (*La corona de Arag n en el siglo XIV*), 2 vols (Valencia, 1970), 2:81 (n.7).

¹⁰⁶Jos -Luis Martin, “Las cortes de Pedro el Ceremonioso,” in *Pere el Cerimoni s i la seva  poca*, ed. Mar a Teresa Ferrer i Mallol (Barcelona, 1989), 102-4.

held by Catalan clergy and laymen.¹⁰⁷ Despite the parliamentary pledge of monetary support for the king in 1358, many Catalans felt that Pere had committed “a great prejudice and grievance” against their homeland by extracting large sums of money from them to support military ventures “in remote lands”; that is, across the Catalan border in Aragon and Valencia.¹⁰⁸

In Pere’s realms where the Castilian threat was the greatest, assemblies took a much harder line concerning war financing. Following course that many town councils would choose,

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 105; idem, “Les Corts catalanes del 1358,” *Estudis d’història medieval* 4 (1971): 71-75; *Colección de los cortes de los antiguos reinos de Aragón y de Valencia y del principado de Cataluña* [CAVC], ed. Fidel Fita y Colomé and Bienvenido Oliver y Estreller, 27 vols. (Madrid, 1896-1922), 1, pt. 2:701-2;

¹⁰⁸*Usatges*, trans. Kagay, 72 (arts. 30, 32); *Customs of Catalonia*, 36-37 (art. 37).

the Aragonese and Valencian *cortes* demanded an ever-increasing share of autonomy in the collection and disbursement of war funds. These meetings appointed executive committees (eventually known as the *Diputació del General* in Aragon and the *Diputació de la Generalidad* in Valencia) whose principal functions were to collect the war subsidies pledged in a full meeting of the *cortes* and then to rapidly pay off the frontier troops whose duty was to ward off Castilian attacks.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹J.A. Sesma Muñoz and J.A. Armillas, *La Diputación de Aragón: El gobierno aragonés del Reino a la Comunidad Autónoma* (Zaragoza, 1991), 16-19; Josè Maria Font y Rius, "The Institutions of the Crown of Aragon in the First Half of the Fifteenth Century," in *Spain in the Fifteenth Century 1369-1516: Essays and Extracts by Historians of Spain*, ed. Roger Highfield, ed. Frances M. López-Morillas (New York, 1972), 175-77; Bisson, *Medieval Crown*, 118.

A good example of how these standing committees operated during the War of the Two Pedros is provided from records emanating from the Aragonese assembly of Cariñena in 1357 that pledged a subsidy to pay the salaries of 700 horsemen for the next two years.¹¹⁰ During the period of the grant, the committee of “deputies, dividers, and distributors,” chosen from each Aragonese estate, assessed the taxes promised by their fellows and gathered the required money by utilizing a household tax identical to the Catalan *fogatge*. The parliamentary agents appointed in 1357 followed the contemporary fiscal methodology of the Crown by issuing receipts for monies expended, by keeping lists of those whose goods had to be distrained to force their contributions to the war fund, and by issuing vouchers for payment of military salaries. Because of his desperate desire to have his soldiers paid for the next two years, Pere allowed these executive committees a great deal of leeway by warning his own officials not to interfere in the process, but instead to give “counsel, favor, and aid” to parliamentary agents whenever

¹¹⁰J.A. Sesma Muñoz and Esteban Sarasa Sánchez, *Cortes del reino de Aragón, 1357-1451. Extractos y fragmentos de procesos desaparecidos* (Valencia, 1976), 17-34; Esteban Sarasa Sánchez, *Las cortes de Aragón en la Edad Media* (Zaragoza, 1979), 44-45.

required.¹¹¹ At the end of this two-year period, Cariñena stood as dangerous precedent of parliamentary autonomy that would soon engulf the entirety of the Crown of Aragon.

¹¹¹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, ff, 157v-68, 203v-4.

With the failure of the treaty of Terrer of 1361 to establish peace between Castile and the Crown of Aragon,¹¹² Pere's financial pessimism deepened to such a point that he could only see one way to rapidly re-tool for war—the gathering of representatives from all his realms in one place. The site of this “parliament” (*parliamentum*) was Monzón, a town perched on the Aragonese-Catalan border which would become the customary center for such general gatherings.¹¹³ Convening the assembly in November, 1362, Pere begged the Aragonese, Valencian, Catalan, and Majorcan representatives to aid him “with subsidies, provisions, and other preparations for the defense of the republic of all our kingdoms and lands.”¹¹⁴ The king then spent the next six months in the attempt to force his badly-divided subjects to act in unison against a real and present danger that could topple the “commonwealth” (*cosa publica*) that bound them as one.¹¹⁵

¹¹²For negotiations leading to and content of the treaty, see ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1163, f. 83v; R. 1176, ff. 11, 90; Zurita, *Anales*, 4:412-8 (IX:xxxiii); Masiá de Ros, *Relación*, 1;280-85.

¹¹³Valdeavellano, *Curso*, 383; Luis González Antón, *Las Cortes de Aragón* (Zaragoza, 1978), 68-69. For configuration of Monzón, see *Spanish Cities of the Golden Age: The Views of Anton van den Wyngaerde*, ed. Richard L. Kagan (Berkeley, 1989), 150-54.

¹¹⁴CDACA, 48:13; Kagay, “Monzón” in 126-27.

¹¹⁵For Pere's appeals to the parliament for unified action, see *CDACA*, 48:54, 63; *Parlaments a les corts catalanes*, ed. Ricard Albert and Joan Gassiot (Barcelona, 1928), 10, 25; Suzanne F. Cawsey, *Kingship and Propaganda: Royal Eloquence and the Crown of Aragon, c.1200-1450* (Oxford, 2002), 137; Kagay, "Monzón," 128-30.

At long last, in March, 1363, the Castilian danger coupled with their sovereign's insistence finally led the members of the Monzón assembly to give in and donate to the war effort. The Crown's fiscal victory, however, was clearly a limited one. The churchmen, nobles, and townsmen who stood before Pere in the cathedral of Santa Maria in Monzón did agree to pay the huge sums demanded of them, but did so on their own and not on the king's terms. Each of the realm's estates conferred separately and assigned the requisite share of the subsidy to its fellows on the basis of rank and wealth.¹¹⁶ Executive committees were chosen in each realm to handle all phases of the war effort from tax collection to the storage of these funds to the payment and deployment of troops along the Crown of Aragon's many threatened frontiers.¹¹⁷ Though Pere was theoretically able to divert the Monzón subsidy in any way he thought best for "the use of the war," the weakened and out-maneuvered ruler had no option but to follow the lead of the "shadow government" that the Monzón assembly and its executive committees

¹¹⁶Kagay, "Monzón," 135-36.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 136-37.

briefly constituted.¹¹⁸ The Aragonese ruler, canny realist that he was, had no intention of giving up even a small portion of his sovereignty, however, and so set out to use his own officials to “shadow” the work of Monzón deputies.

¹¹⁸Ibid., 133-34; *CDACA*, 48:108.

While Pere could not formally reject a parliamentary tax collection scheme he had sworn to uphold, he had no intention of folding up his own fiscal tents. Even after the parliamentary deputies of Monzón had begun their work, he continued to appoint tax commissioners and charge them with the responsibility of collecting special war imposts and receiving subsidy installments from the parliamentary agents.¹¹⁹ Though careful to instruct his men to do “nothing which is [not] pleasing to the *Generalitat*,”¹²⁰ Pere repeatedly put them in situations that did just that. In one instance, he might overturn the tax collection activities of royal officials as prejudicial to the fiscal operations of the parliament’s executive committees,¹²¹ but, before the ink was dry on the first dispatch, would order the same functionaries to confiscate sureties which pledged persons or groups to pay the parliamentary subsidy in the future and to distraint the goods and persons of all those who had yet not paid into the war subsidy—actions which enraged the parliamentary leaders who saw it as a blatant attack on their authority.¹²² Even the point of contact between the parliamentary and royal tax collection efforts that both sides

¹¹⁹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1382, ff. 146r-v; R.1383, ff. 209v-10v.

¹²⁰ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1383, f. 208v.

¹²¹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1382, ff. 90r-v.

¹²²ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, f. 241; R. 1383 , f. 221.

accepted—the final royal audit of subsidy revenues—could prove inflammatory.¹²³ The audit by the *maestre racional* might reveal malfeasance or incompetence on the part of the deputies, ultimately throwing into question the accounts of the entire parliamentary subsidy collection.¹²⁴ Direct royal interference in the parliament’s collection process could also cast doubt on these same financial records. On more than one occasion, Pere, moved by the “great poverty” of many of his over-taxed villagers, declared them exempt for a time from the general subsidy—a move that increased the complexities of an already complex procedure.¹²⁵ In the end, the many-

¹²³*CDACA*, 48:97, 140 (arts. 34, 40); Kagay, “Monzón,” 140. The *maestre racional* would issue a final audit of the two-year subsidy collection after six years. If the parliamentary agents were proved guilty of any “crimes and excesses” by this instrument, the Crown, and not the *cortes*, would punish them

¹²⁴*ACA*, Cancillería real, R. 1381, ff. 243r-v; R. 1383, f. 209.

sided relationship of the parliament's executive committees to the royal administration reflects the open and covert actions of a sovereign who desperately needed his national assemblies, but was thoroughly galled by this dependence.

VIII.

¹²⁵ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, ff. 220-21; R. 1383, f. 245v.

Though the violence unleashed on the Crown of Aragon during the War of the Two Pedros was interspersed with periods of truce or military inactivity, the mere threat of “heavy blows from the king of Castile”¹²⁶ continually weighed down the Aragonese sovereign with one “urgent crisis and emergency”¹²⁷ after another, imposing on him at the same time “an intolerable lack of funds.”¹²⁸ This interminable financial pressure forced Pere to ignore certain aspects of the “commonwealth” and “republic” he repeatedly pledged to defend in exchange for the ready cash necessary to pay troops to secure his frontiers. The irrationality of this position placed Pere in a bind that surely contributed to the many “sleepless nights” he complained of in the Monzón assembly.

¹²⁶ACA, Cartas Reales [Pedro IV], caja 52, no. 6241.

¹²⁷CAVC, 2:8

¹²⁸ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1327, f. 201; DS, 424 (doc.560).

The “continuous zeal and anxiety”¹²⁹ of fighting his “principal adversary” on one hand while squeezing money from his own realms on the other occasionally led Pere to lash out in a violent or even quixotic fashion. In 1363, after months of bargaining with the tight-fisted deputies of the Monzón assembly, the frustrated monarch challenged his startled subjects to follow him against the Castilian enemy “on horseback, on foot, or only with the shirts on their backs.”¹³⁰ Seven years before the impasse that caused the king’s outburst, Pere, an unlikely chivalric warrior, shocked his own people and surely amused his Castilian rival by challenging Pedro to settle their differences on “the field of honor.”¹³¹ No matter how real the emotions underpinning such events might have seemed to Pere or his subjects, the king was essentially driven not to vindicate his honor, but to gain victory over his arch-enemy and this would be accomplished not by courage, but through patience and guile.¹³² This meant that the king would

¹²⁹*CDACA*, 48:51.

¹³⁰*Ibid.*, 64.

¹³¹*ACA*, Cancillería real, R. 1380, f. 12; Pere III, 2:512-3 (VI:11), 547 (VI:40); Donald J. Kagay, “The Theory and Practice of Just War in the Late-Medieval Crown of Aragon,” *Catholic Historical Review* 91 (2005): 596-97.

¹³²For assessment of Pere’s relationship to war, see David A. Cohen, “Secular Pragmatism and Thinking

spend whatever it took to defeat Pedro , even if this meant all his “Christian, Muslim, and Jews” would be driven into bankruptcy.¹³³ This win-at-all-cost attitude would eventually undermine the psychological and demographic structures that had for so long supported Pere’s war effort.

The concomitant stress that a decade of war had on the Aragonese king was reflected in similar fashion among the rate-paying public of the Crown of Aragon. After three general parliamentary subsidies, at least twice as many impost commissions of the Crown, and an all-but-continual royal extortion of cash and *matériel* from individuals and groups in all quarters of eastern Spain, a palpable “tax weariness” gripped Pere’s subjects and forced the king to adapt to it. The first sign of this exhaustion was the purposeful delay or total avoidance of paying war taxes at every level of the Crown of Aragon’s several societies. Because all of the estates had sworn to contribute to general aids in specified increments and their members had put up bonds to guarantee their future compliance, failure to pay into the war fund was tantamount to both

about War in Some Court Writings of Pere III *el Cerimoniós*,” in *Crusades*,50-51.

¹³³ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, f. 115v.

perjury and treason—at least in the mind of the Aragonese king.¹³⁴

¹³⁴Donald J. Kagay, “Defending the Western and Southern Frontiers in the War of the Two Pedros: An Experiment in Nation-Building,” *Journal of the Georgia Association of Historians* 23 (2002): 89.

Though Pere and his tax collectors had the right to distraint those whose duty it was to financially support the war, the very number of these slackers among the clergy, nobility, and townsmen, whose tax-evasion strategies caused untold “damage to the defense of the commonwealth,” forced new solutions on the Crown.¹³⁵ A past master of both the carrot and the stick, Pere turned first to threats and then to fines for those who set out to purposefully avoid paying their tax bill. For the worst of these offenders, he promised “large punishments” and instructed his officials to document their delinquency and draw up a list of these shirkers of national duty.¹³⁶ He occasionally used this information to turn up the pressure even further. In 1360, he turned over the list of lesser Aragonese nobles who had not paid their taxes to the *Justicia Mayor* of Aragon, the highest legal authority in Aragon, instructing him to investigate the

¹³⁵ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, ff. 120, 121v-22,142; R. 1381, ff. 124r-v; R. 1383, f. 221; Ainaga Andrés, “Fogaje,” 49-52.

¹³⁶ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, ff. 163, 231r-v; R. 1382, f.f. 91v, 156v-57; R. 1383, f. 216..

delinquent aristocrats and, if he could prove incontrovertibly their guilt, to strip them of their noble status.¹³⁷

¹³⁷ACA, Cancillería real, ff. 145r-v.

Despite the firm line that Pere communicated to local communities through his officials, the sovereign realized that the prosecution of his taxpaying would ultimately prove detrimental to the general effectiveness of war financing. Behind the royal bluster, then, stood the king's ultimate intention to compromise. He allowed communities to set their own schedules for the collection and delivery of imposts and did not himself neglect the postponement or cancellation of taxes if the situation warranted it.¹³⁸ To put troops on his endangered frontiers, Pere was not above making deals with individuals willing to exchange military service for taxes owed.¹³⁹ He made this practice even more attractive by assuring these substitute soldiers that all their legal and fiscal obligations would be held in abeyance during their entire tour of duty.¹⁴⁰

In a set of lands as litigious as the Crown of Aragon, it was inevitable that Pere's extraordinary efforts at war financing should spark one court challenge after another. In 1360, after two full years of non-support of the Cariñena subsidy, Count Cecilie of Urgel and her nobles ended a long legal battle with the Crown. Cecilie's case was based on the contention that payment into an extraordinary subsidy was prejudicial to the "fueros, privileges, usages, and liberties" of the Countess and her subjects. After weeks of behind-the-scenes negotiations, a

¹³⁸ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, ff. 65r-v; R. 1380, f. 62v; R. 1381, ff. 128, 239v-40.

¹³⁹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1382, ff. 133r-v.

¹⁴⁰ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, f. 165.

deal was brokered that allowed the countess and the residents of her lands to pay a reduced lump-sum payment into the aid and absolved them from full military service.¹⁴¹

¹⁴¹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1383, ff. 199v-201.

In addition to these “zero-sum” suits which sought to question a litigant’s very obligation to pay war taxes, the disputes of Catalan taxpayers centered on how their hard-earned money would be used and especially who would profit from it. In the first months of the war, the ecclesiastical estate of Catalonia filed suit against the government’s collection of war taxes, saying that the process violated national law which mandated the use of Catalan tax money only for the defense of the Principate. The royal judges reinforced the king’s right to use Catalan tax receipts even outside the borders of Catalonia by pointing to the precedent of the expedition against Sardinia (1323-1324) that was broadly supported by Catalan tax money. The obvious lesson for the Catalans was that they could not selectively choose what royal projects their tax receipts were used for.¹⁴²

A great many lawsuits during the Castilian war involved litigants who did not oppose the subsidy itself, but instead attempted to reduce one’s tax bill by denying lordship and fiscal liability for territory that the Crown was attempting to tax. Ironically, the basis for most of the suits was contested boundaries—the very *casus belli* for the Castilian conflict itself. When an Aragonese subsidy was approved at Cariñena in 1358, ecclesiastical and lay lords with

¹⁴²ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1380, ff. 44r-v. For Sardinian expedition, see David Abulafia, *The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms 1200-1500: The Struggle for Dominion* (London, 1997), 123-27, 179-80; idem, *A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca* (Cambridge, 1994), 249-52; Antonio Arribas Palau, *La conquista de Cerdeña per Jaime II de Aragón* (Barcelona, 1952); Vincente Salvat y Roca, “La isla de Cerdeña y la política internacional de Jaime II de Aragón,” *Hispania* 10 (1950): 211-65.

holdings straddling the Catalan-Aragonese border made the case that they had no obligation to contribute into the Aragonese war chest since their lands were Catalan. Playing no favorites, they presumably claimed that their lands were Aragonese when pressed by Catalan tax gatherers

In 1359, Pere's cousin, Count Alfonso of Ribagorza and Denia, refused to pay into the Aragonese subsidy for the entire Pyrenean region of Montanya which he claimed had settled under "the custom of Catalonia" and thus had to be considered Catalan territory.¹⁴³ In the next year, the royal judiciary was called on to render a settlement for a much more complicated case between the ecclesiastical estate of Aragon led by the archbishop of Zaragoza on one side and the principal official of the Hospital in the Crown of Aragon, the castellan of Amposta, on the other. The castellan, whose order had tax responsibilities in both Aragon and Catalonia, attempted to lessen, at least temporarily, the Hospital's final obligation to the 1358 subsidy by determining if four small villagers were Aragonese or Catalan.¹⁴⁴ In 1361, the king's uncle, Ramon Berenguer, count of Amposta, made the same claim of no liability for the Cariñena subsidy in regard to the border village of Oya which, he inserted, had long been considered

¹⁴³ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, f. 242v.

¹⁴⁴ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1383, f. 242v. The four border villages litigated over were Orta, Gandesa, Miravet, and Alquezar (?).

Catalan.¹⁴⁵ In none of these cases was Pere's judiciary in the mood to engage in cartography; instead, his judges acted as arbitrators and hammered out compromises that required the litigants to pay into the 1358 subsidy, but a reduced rate.

¹⁴⁵ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1383, ff. 197r-v.

Even more serious for the financing of Pere's war effort than outright opposition or legal foot-dragging was the demographic and social breakdown that ten years of war brought in its wake. Great swaths of Aragon and Valencia were "at the point of depopulation and loss"¹⁴⁶; even the Castilian borderland was in jeopardy of becoming a "wasteland...caused by the great slaughter."¹⁴⁷ Many hamlets were ruined, their dwellings demolished and open to the "frigid weather."¹⁴⁸ Many villages "which had been settled from olden times were so destroyed that hardly any vestiges of [them] remained."¹⁴⁹ While much of the destruction could rightly be attributed to his Castilian enemies, the king could not ignore the fact that his own troops were also guilty of such mayhem.¹⁵⁰ No matter who was responsible for the ruin of Aragonese and

¹⁴⁶ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1383, ff. 194v-95.

¹⁴⁷*Cortes de los antiguos reinos de León y de Castilla*, ed. Real Academia de Historia, 5 vols. (Madrid, 1882-1903), 2:149

¹⁴⁸ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, ff. 33r-v.

¹⁴⁹María Desamparados Cabanes Pecourt, "Cartas de población en le dominio verolense," *Aragón en la Edad Media* 6 (1984): 102.

¹⁵⁰ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, ff. 117, 123r-v. Since one of Pere's largest contingents was led by the Castilian royal contender, Enrique de Trastámara, Aragonese settlements repeatedly had to be reminded that

Valencian frontiers, most of eastern Spain, like contemporary France, had grown used to being held hostage by war.¹⁵¹

Pedro's half-brother was an Aragonese ally and, as such, would be treated with respect.

¹⁵¹Marc Bloch, *French Royal History: An Essay on its Basic Characteristics*, trans. Janet Sondheimer (Berkeley, 1966), 113.

The effect of the long border war with Castile on the social order of the Crown of Aragon was equally devastating in both the threatened borderlands and in the large cities of the region. In the first months of the war, Pere received a disturbing report concerning “sons of the devil jealous of peace and quiet... unleash[ing] banditry” on his Catalan capital. He instructed the Procurator of Catalonia, Ramon de Montcada, to “block the evil attempts...of the iniquitous population” in any way his “true power” saw fit.¹⁵² At the same time, long-dormant feuds between important Valencian families, encouraged by the violent instability of the period, burst again into existence.¹⁵³

Across the Crown of Aragon, clerics found themselves at the mercy of royal officials who took the unprecedented step of imprisoning “priests, tonsured men, and those bound by ecclesiastical judicial authority,” often for the non-payment of the latest round of war taxes.¹⁵⁴ Churchmen were also at the mercy of increasingly-violent parishioners and not even bishops were safe from being “daily... abused, oppressed, and damaged by multiple lawsuits, deputies,

¹⁵²ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1380, ff. 49r-v.

¹⁵³ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1184, f. 1; *DHC*, 19-20.

¹⁵⁴ACA, Cancillería real, R. 722, f. 34; *DS*, 463-64 (doc. 612).

dangers, and discord.”¹⁵⁵ The Crown of Aragon had clearly seen firsthand what Eustache Deschamps had described in France: “War is nothing but damnation...The walls are falling. Things go ill and it’s dangerous.”¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵*DS*, 466-67 (doc. 616).

¹⁵⁶H.J. Hewitt, *The Organization of War under Edward III, 1338-62* (Manchester, 1966), 134.

Pere could hardly avoid the “sterility of the times” and the “indescribable poverty” he saw with his own eyes.¹⁵⁷ As year after year of war passed, he could not escape the fact that much of the instability and psychological distress suffered by his people was not brought on solely by an odious, Castilian enemy, but was also due, at least partially, to the many “different sums of money... [his people] always ... [had] to give and pay”; in one communique, at least, he assumed the shame of allowing “the places of our frontiers ...[to become] depopulated.”¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, ff. 28v-30.

¹⁵⁸ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, f. 245v.

Despite this regret (whether real or feigned), the war had to be paid for and this meant that taxes continued to be levied and collected with deadening regularity. No group bore a heavier fiscal burden for the continuance of the war than the infidel populations of eastern Spain. Subject to all the same general subsidies as their Christian counterparts, Jewish and Muslim *aljamas* also had to provide money and supplies whenever Pere's military effort needed such support.¹⁵⁹ Other royal directives attempted to criminalize the trading between regions of grain and other foodstuffs earmarked for troops, thus closing off a profitable black market that might have buoyed the sagging economies of Aragonese and Valencian infidel populations.¹⁶⁰ As it was, the combination of Castilian raiding which left frontier settlements (many of them with large *aljamas*) "very often devastated" and the steady exactions of the Aragonese government left many infidel communities as "paupers who...[could] not bear customary tax burdens."¹⁶¹ The extent to which Pere's "royal treasure" had been systematically emptied by the

¹⁵⁹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, ff. 144r-v; R. 1380, f. 129v; R. 1381, ff. 66v-67; R. 1384, f. 2. For the general economic situation of the Jewish and Muslim communities during the period of the Castilian war, see Baer, *History*, 2:28-34; John Boswell, *The Royal Treasure: Muslim Communities under the Crown of Aragon in the Fourteenth Century* (New Haven, Conn., 1977), 196-226.

¹⁶⁰ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1382, ff. 131r-v.

¹⁶¹ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1381, f. 62; Cartas reales [Pedro IV], nos. 6100, 6107.

ravenous demands of the Castilian war became more obvious as each year passed and the Crown had no choice but to grant one “tax extension” (*elongamentum*) after another to financially-drained *aljamas*.¹⁶² Despite the obvious danger signs that Pere formally recognized, the king, like his Christian, Muslim, and Jewish subjects, was enthralled by the war and the financial machinery devised to serve it.

IX.

In 1366, the bitter struggle between the rulers and realms of Castile and the Crown of Aragon had ended in a whimper in the midst of a Castilian civil war which, by 1369, had cost Pedro his life and given his crown to his arch-enemy and half-brother, Enrique de Trastámara.¹⁶³

¹⁶²Boswell, *Royal Treasure*, 227-28.

¹⁶³Clara Estow, *Pedro the Cruel of Castile, 1350-1369* (Leiden, 1995), 232-69; L.J. Andrew Villalon, “Pedro the Cruel: Portrait of a Royal Failure,” in *Medieval Iberia: Essays on the History and Literature of Medieval Spain*, ed.

The War of the Two Pedros had set the stage for these dramatic events, however, and presaged the course of Iberian events for decades to come.

Donald J. Kagay and Joseph T. Snow (New York, 1997), 208-11; P.E. Russell, *The Spanish Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the Time of Edward III and Richard II* (Oxford, 1955), 108-48.; Kenneth Fowler, *The Great Companies*, vol. 1 of *Medieval Mercenaries*, 1 vol. to date (Oxford, 2001), 163-222.

The connection of Pere's role as war financier to these momentous events is a direct one. Disdaining his enemy's policy of coinage debasement to make up the shortfalls brought on by the long war, Pere, like contemporary English sovereigns, did not dare to stray from the road of strong money.¹⁶⁴ With the avenue of devaluation closed to him, the Aragonese king had to fall back on the time-worn methods of customary taxation and feudal military service. As one campaigning season melded into another, however, Pere realized that traditional means of supplying and paying for war would suffice no longer. The maintenance of standing armies, however, was not really the problem. Jaume I, Pere II, Jaume II, and even Pere himself had put large armies in the field for fairly long periods. These campaigns, however, were wars of conquest and were not fought to defend the frontiers of the Crown of Aragon.

¹⁶⁴Spufford, *Money*, 314-5; Octavio Gil Farres, *Historia de la moneda española* (Madrid, 1959), 210-3.

The standing war that engulfed much of eastern Spain was a different thing and required novel solutions that attempted to group into a military union peoples with different languages who considered each other “foreigners.”¹⁶⁵ To survive, the Aragonese king had to increasingly rely on his parliaments and grudgingly assent to their increased power and autonomy. Whether or not Pere’s innovations stand as one of the headwaters of what Thompson calls the “fiscal-state” that grew up in Spain from the time of the Catholic Kings,¹⁶⁶ Pere’s actions in the Castilian war does not signify—as Bisson suggests—a complete “loss of initiative in policy and finance.”¹⁶⁷ Instead, it points to a sovereign “of a poor state in a rich country”¹⁶⁸ who quickly realized that the battlefield which faced him could not be understood through the military truisms of the past. Victory could not be won with courage and advanced strategy alone; it now could never be attained without money. This realization had its limits, however, for (to

¹⁶⁵Sesma Muñoz, “Fijación,” 155-61.

¹⁶⁶Thompson, “Money,” 288-89.

¹⁶⁷Bisson, *Medieval Crown*, 118.

¹⁶⁸C.-E. Dufourcq and J. Gautier-Dalché, *Histoire économique et sociale de la Espagne chrétienne au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1976), 205; Hillgarth, “Royal Accounts,” 14.

paraphrase R.I. Burns), money talks, but has a limited vocabulary.¹⁶⁹ For Pere III in his epic struggle against Pedro I, the key words in this vocabulary were “determination, cunning, and survival.”

¹⁶⁹Burns, *Medieval Colonialism*, 344