Disposable Alliances: Aragon and Castile
during the War of the Two Pedros and Beyond

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If as Clausewitz declared “war is diplomacy by other means,”¹ the very waging of armed conflict itself provides new opportunities for diplomats who, like soldiers, were bound “to serve the preservation and aggrandizement” of their states.² While the golden age of such agents who “were sent to lie abroad” for their masters supposedly commenced in the Renaissance,³ many of the diplomatic forms of the time such as letters of credence and resident ambassadors had already been developed within the Aragonese “empire” of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.⁴ Even though the activities of ambassadors in a Renaissance age dominated by “personal ambition, rivalry, or resentment” are better known,⁵ a similar Machiavellian cant can be seen with that able “administrator of diplomatic intrigue,” Pere III of Aragon (1336-1387).⁶ To test the depths of the Aragonese king’s skill

³Ibid., 201.
⁵Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, 140.
⁶Antonio Gutierrez de Velasco, “Molina en la Corona de Aragón (1369-1375),” Teruel 6 (1951): 75.
Donald J. Kagay

as deceptive arbitrator and diplomat, this paper will focus on the period between 1356 and 1378. By tracing the diplomatic developments between Aragon and Castile during this time frame, one is struck not only by the Pere III’s attainments in double-dealing, but also by how deeply the major contenders in the Hundred Years War, France and England, were effected by the political and martial affairs of the “minor” states of Spain.\(^7\)

I.

War broke on the major states of the Iberian Peninsula in the fall of 1356 when Francesc de Perellós, one of Pere III’s privateers who would later become an important Aragonese ambassador, attacked ships of Piacenza, a small Italian city-state allied to Pedro I of Castile (1350-1366/69).\(^8\) Furious at this affront to his royal dignity, the twenty-two-year-old ruler berated his Aragonese counterpart (fifteen years his senior) in a number of letters sent between August and October of 1356. Claiming that Pere had encouraged his people “to commit crimes and dangers in... [his ] lands,” the fuming Castilian sovereign issued a “defiance” (deafio) to his former friend and ally that amounted to an open declaration of war.\(^9\) Pere played the hurt innocent in missives of the same provenance, in which he

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accused Pedro of declaring war “unjustly and without reason.”

For the next ten years, the two rivals engaged in a bitter frontier conflict and a campaign of propaganda ever bit as rancorous. Viewing Pere as a cowardly supporter of pirates and highwaymen, Pedro repeatedly called for vengeance in the most blatant of terms. Pere maintained the same level of hatred, but did so more cleverly by seldom calling the Castilian ruler by name, but by assigning to him such hateful epithets as “our public enemy,” and “that wicked and false traitor” whom God would “surely put to shame and cover with confusion.” Despite this comforting war of words, however, neither of the principals could live without allies. Pedro soon found support with the Nasirid ruler, Muhammad V (1354-1359; 1362-1391), and with his Portuguese namesake and uncle, Pedro I of Portugal (1357-1367). Pere, on the other hand, had no such luxury and could only

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11 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1379, f. 13v; Luis Vicente Díaz Martín, Itinerario de Pedro I de Castilla: Estudio y Regesta (Valladolid, 1975), 342 (doc. 682); J. B. Sitges, Las mujeres del rey don Pedro I de Castille (Madrid, 1910), 216-19; Pere III, 2:499 (VI:3). From the beginning, Pedro burned “to retaliate for this matter as we must and as it is fitting for our honor.”


15 L.P. Harvey, Islamic Spain 1250 to 1500 (Chicago, 1992), 208-9; Hugh Kennedy, Muslim Spain and Portugal: A
Donald J. Kagay

find supporters among Pedro’s growing array of enemies.

Within weeks of Pedro I’s declaration of war, Pere, daily growing more frantic, cast about for help among his barons and other minor retainers. In the early fall of 1356, he wrote Perellós to order an irregular sea-war against Castilian ports and shipping for the next four months. At the same time, he called on “the intimate benevolence and friendship” of his Pyrenean vassal, Gaston III “Phoebus” of Foix (1342-1391) in defending against the “excesses” of the Castilian king. Almost as an afterthought, he cautioned the crafty Gaston not to prevent the passage through his lands of any Castilian troops who wished to join the fight against Pedro. For the next year, the Aragonese king followed this policy of generous support to disaffected Castilians if they would “wage war and do as much damage as they could” to their former feudal lord. For the greatest of these emigrés, Enrique de Trastámara, and his brother, Tello, Pere promised protection for themselves and their families, full salaries for their troops, and a new start in the Crown of Aragon with the grant of a “good village” that would bring a sizeable annual income.

War had hardly broken out between Aragon and Castile when Pere and Pedro’s disgruntled siblings came to much the same conclusion: they needed each other if they


16 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 45v-46.
17 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 43v-45.
18 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, f. 50v.
19 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 43, 50.
intended to survive the cruel vengeance of their common enemy. This symbiotic relationship became possible because of certain fortunate occurrences in recent, Castilian, dynastic history. Enrique de Trastámara, born in 1333 as the legitimate son of Alfonso XI of Castile (1312-1350) and Leonore de Guzman, possessed little besides the noble title that came to him from his fortunate royal connections. Enrique and his brothers eked out an uncertain though often lucrative existence as “robber barons” who preyed on the merchant caravans that meandered across northern Spain. Making peace with his half-brother in 1352, Enrique and Tello soon entered into the conspiracies that swirled around Pedro’s mother, Maria of Portugal, and her over-mighty adviser, Juan Alfonso de Albuquerque. When the Portuguese faction was defeated in 1354, Pedro’s troublesome relatives saw the political writing on the wall and left their homeland for more promising employment across the Pyrenees in the service of Jean II of France (1350-1369). The enmity between Pedro and his half-brothers was now dyed-in-the-wool and would soon make them into some of Pere III’s greatest allies.

The Aragonese offer on August 20, 1356 of a frontier settlement and a 100,000 sous guaranteed from its rents was more than enough to draw Trastámara away from French

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21Zurita, Anales, 4:306-7 (IX:v); Kagay, “Conflict,” 84-85. For Castilians in French armies of the fourteenth century, see David Nicolle, French Armies of the Hundred Years War (Oxford, 2000), 5-6.
Donald J. Kagay

affairs and back into the stormy realm of Iberian politics.\textsuperscript{22} Throughout the fall, the count gathered a body of anti-Pedro retainers and then led them across the central Pyrenees into Aragon. Enrique and Pere concluded the first of a great number of agreements in November, 1356, renewing and expanding this pact on August 30 of the next year. The principal terms of the new alliance were: (1) the royal grant to the mercenary of villages in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, over which Enrique would have “all jurisdiction, high and low” and (2) a very careful delineation of the salary of heavily and lightly armored horsemen. The accord, formed from undisguised need on the part of both parties, was drawn up in the form of a feudal control. Enrique accepted Pere as his “true prince” while Pere promised to defend his new retainer “as a good king and lord must.” Neither of the signatories, however, abandoned reality with their acceptance of the pact. The Aragonese king, in fact warned his new Castilian, military right hand that if he engaged in the same kind of traitorous activity against Pere that he had against Pedro, he would not be able defend himself “with or without weapons.”\textsuperscript{23}

The true crux of the new relationship between king and count was the question of financial support. Spelled out in 1356 and then renewed in 1357, 1358, 1361, and 1364, the fiscal agreement proved the touchiest to enforce. By this pact, Enrique was to receive an annual subsidy of 130,000\textit{sous} of both Barcelona and Jaca money to be drawn from Queen

\textsuperscript{22}ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, f. 43.

\textsuperscript{23}ACA, Cancillería real, Varia, R. 68, ff. 69-74; Ángeles Masiá de Ros, \textit{Relación castellano-aragonesa desde Jaime II a Pedro El Ceremonioso}, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1994), 2:444-51 (doc 213/78bis); Pere III, 2:510 (VI:8); Zurita, \textit{Anales}, 4:306-7 (IX:v). The sites that Trastámara were given control over were Tamarite de Litera, Riecha, and Epila in Aragon; Montblanch, Tarrega, and Vilagrasa in Catalonia; and Castellón and Villareal in Valencia.
Disposable Alliances

Elionor’s Aragonese revenues and the rents of certain Aragonese and Valencian towns. The count could use his own collectors to gather this money, but had to produce an accurate accounting of how much money was collected and spent. The comfortable logic of this plan was offset by the fiscal reality that Enrique encountered on the local level. Facing a myriad of excuses from the townsmen suddenly put within the reach of his agents attempting to fill his chronically empty war chest, Pere’s new Castilian captain used intimidation and even claimed urban hostages until the promised funds were forthcoming. To keep the count paid and satisfied, the Aragonese ruler was not above speculation on the Mediterranean grain market to pay off military salaries long in arrears.

Even when the uncertain fiscal nature of their alliance pushed it to the breaking point, diplomatic realities also sorely tested the sworn bonds between Enrique and Pere. In the papal-brokered peace of Murviedro (1363), Pere’s negotiators had come to an agreement with those of Pedro that their royal master would not allow Castilian emigrès to pass across the Aragonese border to their homeland. They also assured Pedro’s diplomats that Pere would break all ties to Trastámara and the members of his family. Though going through

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24ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 84v-85v. ; Varia, R. 68, f. 69v; Masiá de Ros, Relación, 2:533-36 (doc. 233/162). Rents were drawn from Jativa, Alcira, Murviedro, Morella, and Calatayud.


26Zurita, Anales, 4:464-66; Pero López de Ayala, Coronica del rey don Pedro, ed. Constance L. Wilkins and Heanon M. Wilkins (Madison, Wisc., 1985), 136-37 (14th year, chap. 5); Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “La frontera meridional valenciana durant la guerra amb Castella dita dels Dos Peres,” in Pere el Cerimoniós i la seva època, ed. Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol (Barcelona, 1989), 285; idem, “The Southern Valencian Frontier during...
with the rupture with his Castilian vassal, Pere was spared the nasty reality of what to do with Trastámara and his other mercenaries by Pedro himself who violated the accord in mere weeks on the grounds that the Aragonese had not carried out the secret clause of the treaty which mandated the deaths of both Enrique and Prince Ferran, Pere’s own half-brother. Thus, even though Pere had released his Castilian captain, he was quickly able to call him back from France, along with a sizeable contingent of over 2,000 horse and foot.27

Despite the difficulty Pere encountered in having his Castilian mercenaries paid on a regular basis, he soon found that Enrique’s burning hatred of Pedro and his skill as a guerilla fighter definitely made him worth this salt. Enrique’s value as an offensive rather than a defensive captain was soon apparent to all in 1360 when he and Count Bernat of Osona led a daring *chevauchée* across the Ebro River into Castile’s La Rioja district. Seriously damaging Haro and ravaging the Jewish *aljama* of Najera, Pere’s raiders met a large force commanded by the Castilian king at Ariviana outside of Najera. In a bitter battle, the Aragonese razzia delivered a stinging defeat to Pedro’s much larger force that endangered the king’s life and led to the deaths of several great Castilian nobles and churchmen as well as 150 unnamed knights.28

The surprising ease with which the cross-border raid of 1360 unleashed devastation against Pedro convinced Pere of Enrique’s worth, not just as a frontier captain, but also as a

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27 Pere III, 2:536-37 (VI:30); Ayala, 137 (14th year, chap. 5); Ferrer i Mallol, “Frontera,” 287.

28 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1387, ff. 183v-84; Ayala, 111-3 (chaps. i-vii); Kagay, “Dynastic Dimension,” 85.
viable contender for the Castilian throne. The Aragonese king’s recognition of the count as a useful cat’s-paw was increased immeasurably in July, 1363 when Enrique conspired with the important royal counselor, Bernat de Cabrera, to murder Pere’s troublesome and dangerous half-brother, Prince Ferran. From this point, Trastámara, as the early-modern chronicler observed, first hoped “that he could undertake to make himself king of Castile.”

Apparently moved by his captain’s confidence, Pere took rapid action to profit from Enrique’s hatred of his sibling. To make a Castilian invasion a reality, royal and comital envoys met through the late-summer of 1363 to hammer out an agreement that was approved by their principals in September. By this accord, Pere and Enrique exchanged their sons as hostages, taking care that they would be maintained in proper state in Pyrenean castles for “two whole months.” With these human sureties under guard, Pere promised to supply Enrique with 1500 horse and a 1000 foot as well as two months operating funds of 27,000 florins. In exchange for this support, Enrique pledged to undertake an invasion of his homeland by November and to give to his Aragonese backer one-sixth of everything he conquered including a long list of Castilian frontier towns.

29 Pere III, 2:538-40 (VI:35); Ayala, 137-38 (14th year: chap. 6); Zurita, Anales, 4:472-73 (IX:xlvii); Kagay, “Conflict,” 94-95.

30 Zurita, Anales, 4:457 (IX:xlvi).

31 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 167-70v. The royal hostages were accommodated in Opol and Taltaull, castles in the county of Roussillon.

32 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, f. 163; R. 1543, f. 66v; Masiá de Ros, Relación, 2; 531-33 (doc. 233/164); Zurita, Anales, 4:457 (IX:xliv). The towns Enrique promised to Pere if he defeated his half-brother were Murcia, Requena, Otiell, Moya, Canyet, Concha, Molina, Medinaceli, Almazan, Soria, and Agreda. Enrique’s failure to hand over these towns even after he had attained final victory over Pedro caused a decade-long rift
Donald J. Kagay

For several reasons including Pedro’s opening of a massive offense operation early in 1364, Enrique’s planned invasion did not take place but was hardly forgotten. After two years of attack and counterattack around Valencia and Murviedro, Enrique again brought up the question of Castilian invasion. Though he repeatedly complained that his treasury was in a sorry state and that the war news from the southern frontier was continually bad, Pere was yet again disposed to take a chance on Trastámara. Thus on January 25, 1366 “during the siege of... Murviedro,” the Aragonese king and Castilian count concluded “a confederacy of love” between them that guaranteed 1,000 horse and as many foot to be paid for by the Aragonese Crown for two months. Pere also allowed his cousin, Count Alfons of Denia, and Count Gaston Phoebus III of Foix to volunteer their services to Enrique along with a large contingent of horsemen, infantry, and crossbowmen. So his protégé could not assume that this help was free, Pere had him agree to a “perpetual grant” of the same towns listed in the 1363 accord as well as the return of all Aragonese and Valencian urban sites Pedro had captured over the past ten years. To make their alliance a permanent one, the elder member of the pact pushed for the conclusion of a marriage agreement between Enrique’s son, Juan, and his daughter, Leonore, on whom he settled the royal dowry of 200,000 florins.

between the signatories of the 1363 pact.

33 Ayala, 141-42 (15th year, chap. 1-2; Zurita, Anales, 499-504 (IX:liv); Pere, 2:548-50 (VI:41).
34 Ayala, 142-46 (15th year, chaps. iii-x; 16th year, chaps. i-iii); Pere III, 2:544-55 (VI:40-45); Zurita, Anales, 4:485-87, 505-11 (IX:li, lv).
35 ACA, R. 1293, ff. 126, 127v-28v; R. 1543, ff. 62r-v, 66v, 68v-69, 70; Masiá de Ros, Relación, 2:541-45 (doc.
By the early spring of 1366, Enrique led his army of approximately 5,000 troops into Castile and soon found that his arch-enemy was unwilling to commit his fate to the battlefield. “The Bastard,” as Enrique was called by sources temporarily allied to Pedro, thus drove through northern Castile, having himself proclaimed king at Calahorra and then crowned at Burgos. Pere received the “good news” of his ally’s victory with great joy. Somewhat belatedly, he sent a small party of knights to join Enrique’s army to bring “encouragement... [to the new king] and damage to his enemies.” During this period of heady excitement, Pere was more than willing to act as his ally’s agent and propagandist. When Enrique’s wife, Juana, asked his leave to cross through his lands to join her husband, the king had her honorably escorted across Catalonia and Aragon to the Castilian border. Keeping up a steady correspondence with Enrique, he smugly informed Pope Urban VI (1362-1370), Charles V of France (1364-1380) and a number of French barons that “the illustrious king of Castile” had assumed the customary “diadem of his reign” and “he who was king [Pedro]” was defeated.

Despite having large pockets of support within Castile, Pedro seemed unwilling to
Donald J. Kagay

confront his hated sibling’s invasion in any meaningful way. Instead, he moved across his realms, but never confronted the interloper. After all the major cities of northern Castile turned against him and to Enrique, Pedro retreated to Seville “where his treasure had remained.”40 Taking ship, he made his way to the court of Edward, the Black Prince, at Bayonne. By September, 1366, Castilian and English negotiators had worked out an agreement between the crown prince and the exiled king that exchanged British military aid for Pedro’s grant of Galicia to his new ally.41

With this new military cloud on the horizon, the ever-cautious Pere began to hedge his bets in regard to Enrique. Fissures had almost immediately begun to appear in Aragon’s alliance with the new Castilian sovereign. Though Pere had sworn his support to Enrique’s “life, safety, and honor,” he forbade “free passage” of Enrique’s French allies across Aragonese territory. Though this voided their earlier pacts, Pere claimed that the French companies under the command of the great military leader, Bertran du Guesclin would cause “disorder and destruction” to his frontier districts, most especially to the crucial grain harvest.42 Under mounting Castilian pressure, Pere relented but diverted the large foreign force across the less-populated regions of Roussillion to Jaca where they could take the

40 Chandos Herald, 150; Ayala, 147-53 (16th year, chaps. i-xi).


Disposable Alliances

Though this primal issue of accessibility of Enrique’s foreign troops to his realm was thus worked out (even if in a rather ham-handed way), Pere and his Castilian ally were clearly growing suspicious of each other.

After an unbroken record of success in the first half of 1366, Enrique faced the second half with some trepidation as his arch-enemy gathered an army of English-sponsored mercenaries and his avowed supporter began to show himself less than trustworthy. Because of his growing distrust of the “then-count and now king” as well as the real possibility of a re-ascendant Pedro, the Aragonese ruler moved to protect his exposed position between the two warring siblings. In June, 1366, Pere fanned the flames of Enrique’s misgivings by formally removing from his control the Aragonese, Catalan, and Valencian frontier towns and villages he had received when entering Aragonese service. Shortly afterwards Pere’s diplomats came before the new Castilian king with a list of demands including the terms of the dowry for the upcoming marriage, the transfer of the promised Castilian cities, the extradition of the “traitor,” Count Bernat de Osona, and the return of all Valencian citizens who had been captured by the “evil man who had been king [Pedro]. While Pere remained adamant that the Castilian king should carry out their pre-

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44 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1543, f. 58; Masiá de Ros, _Relación_, 1:330-31; 2:555-56 (doc. 240/198).

45 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 127v-28. For the fall of Pere’s principal counselor, Count Bernat II of Cabrera and his son, the count of Osona, see Donald J. Kagay, “The ‘Treasons’ of Bernat de Cabrera:
invasion agreement and turn over to his “faithful friend” of Aragon the frontier towns he had promised to, Enrique proved exceedingly unwilling to do so. To force Castilian compliance, Pere threatened to hold up the wedding between the Aragonese and Castilian heirs until Enrique pledged a huge sum in lieu of the territory he had promised to the father of the bride.

With their very official communications seething with such hyperbole, Enrique, a proven survivor, came to look on Pere as little more than an enemy-in-the-making. He could scarcely know, however, how accurate was his assessment of Pere’s motives and actions. In December, 1366, almost at the point of having “to sell or pawn almost all Our patrimony,” the king gave secret orders to his principal “minter of Barcelona” to strike a counterfeit version of “the silver money that King Enrique makes.” This illegal operation was to be carried out in the strictest secrecy inside the royal castle of Murviedro, a structure that had been held by Pedro for some years and had fallen back into Aragonese hands only months before. To allay the fears of his moneyer, Pere promised to indemnify him “from every...

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46 Guitiérrez y Velasco, “Molina,” 77.

47 Pere III, 2:578-79, 581-82 (VI:61, 63). Enrique did not deny his earlier accord with Pere but claimed that the Castilian cortes forbade the granting away of royal patrimony because it would cause “harm and great damage” to Castile. The sum promised but never fully paid amounted to 180,000 golden florins of Aragon or their equivalent.

48 Pere III, 2:591 (app. 2).

Disposable Alliances

person who might come against” him.50

Ironically, the scheme would not only bail out the master of a “strong money” state by
purposeful coinage devaluation, but would attempt to ruin the leader of a “weak money”
realm by engaging in economic practices he would soon turn to in order merely to survive.51

Enrique de Trastamara could never have foreseen that three years of bitter civil law
ahead when his 1366 expedition so easily toppled “the evil tyrant...called king.”52 When that
exiled sovereign, Pedro, bought English support by pledging to give away vast portions of
his wealth and territory, the new Castilian king begged his subjects to pray that God would
ensure “victory and conquest against our enemies.”53 Despite these entreaties to the
Almighty, the companies of the Black Prince assembled at Dax in southern France, and, at
the head of the great warrior and his Castilian employer, they passed through the pass of

50Ibid., 103. A similar type of counterfeiting scheme took place in Molina in the summer of 1370 [ACA,
Cancillería real, R. 1551, f. 25v; Gutiérrez de Velasco, “Molina,” 111-12.

51Peter Spufford, Money and its Use in Medieval Europe (Cambridge 1988), 314-5; Octavio Gil Farres, Historia de
la moneda española (Madrid, 1959), 210-3; Donald J. Kagay, “War Financing in the Late-Medieval

52Julio Valdeon Baruque, Enrique II de Castilla: La guerra civil y la consolidación del régimen (1366-1371) (Valladolid,
1966), 96.

53Ibid., 98. Pedro’s “treasure” was much greater in the imagination of the English than in reality. To gain the
support of the Black Prince and other British troops, he promised to hand over “a gold table, with hinges of
fine gold, bordered with many stones of the Orient...in the center glittered a carbuncle of such great virtue
that it shone at midnight as the sun shone at noon.” According to Zurita, echoing Ayala, however, Pedro’s
entire monetary worth amounted to no more than 300,000 florins and was spent before his exile was half over
in the Middle Ages, 12th - 15th Century: Cultural, Literary, and Political Changes (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 17;
Zurita, Anales, 4:551 (IX:lxvi)].
Roncesvalles and the Navarrese capital of Pamplona in mid-February, 1367.\textsuperscript{54} The passage of scouting parties and the main body of Pedro’s mercenary across the Ebro between Logroño and Vitoria in the following weeks alarmed both Enrique and his erstwhile Aragonese ally.\textsuperscript{55}

For some six months, Pere had readied his lands for the coming of the supporters of Castile’s rival kings. In June, 1366, he alerted the governor of Aragon, Jordan Pérez d’Urries, that “great companies... [from] France, England, Brittany, and other regions” would be attempting in the near future to cross Aragonese territories into Castile. Assuring his functionary that these troops were not “coming to serve God against the Moors,” but rather would cause “disservice to God and the destruction of Spain.”\textsuperscript{56} To protect his territory along the Ebro, Pere ordered a number of town and village militias to muster not to wage war on the mercenaries, but to hasten their passage into Castile.\textsuperscript{57} Though Pere was still formally allied to the newest Castilian king, he met this initial arrival of Enrique’s retainers in much the same way as he did in 1367 when Pedro’s army crossed the Pyrenees. In the latter case, he had the frontier population of northern Aragon removed to strongly garrisoned local fortresses where they would wait out with their families, goods, and livestock the

\textsuperscript{54}Ayala, 159-60 (2nd year, chaps. i-ii); Chandos Herald, 152-55; L.J. Andrew Villalon, “Spanish Involvement in the Hundred Years War and the Battle of Nájera,” in \textit{The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus} (Leiden, 2005), 26-28.

\textsuperscript{55}Ayala, 160-61 (chaps. iii-iv); Villalon, “Spanish Involvement,” 28-29.

\textsuperscript{56}ACA, \textit{Cancillería real}, R. 1388, f. 31; Masiá de Ros, \textit{Relación}, 2:557 (doc 241/201).

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid. Militias were summoned from the cities of Huesca and Jaca and from the villages of Tiermes, Sos, Unicastillo, Sudava, Exea, Tauste, and Campdalaub.
passage of the Black Prince’s troops into Castilian territory.\textsuperscript{58} Though bound by a number of diplomatic accords which required him to stand firmly against Enrique’s enemies, Pere, like all the other actors in this topsy-turvy drama, demonstrated that regnal survival and territorial aggrandizement meant far more to him than the sanctity of his sworn word.

II.

For all the anxiety and craftiness that fill his communiques during the winter and spring of 1367, Pere III was largely a witness that led two Castilian kings to take the battlefield of Nájera on Saturday, April 3, in order to determine which of their royal claims would stand. After the wings of Enrique’s polyglot army crumbled under intense English pressure, the land above the Najarilla River became a brutal killing ground and the stream’s water ran “red with the blood that flowed from the bodies of dead men and horses.”\textsuperscript{59} After months of exile, Pedro had once again made good his claims to the throne. The “Bastard”, however, lived to fight another day and this would ultimately seal his half-brother’s fate. Thus, rather than bringing closure to the muddled Castilian dynastic affairs, Nájera opened the way to a bloody civil war that held Castile, the Pyrenean borderlands and the Crown of Aragon in its grip for over two years. Surely no one scanned these events more closely than did the Aragonese king who temporized to a void openly supporting one or the other of the battling siblings while he attempted to keep his lands safe from the Castilian malestrom that

\textsuperscript{58}ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1388, f. 163v; Masiá de Ros, Relación, 2:559 (doc. 243/204).

\textsuperscript{59}Chandos Herald, 164; L.J. Andrew Villalon, “Spanish Involvement in the Hundred Year War and the Battle of Nájera,” in Hundred Years War, 46.
continually threatened to spill over the Aragonese borders.

In the first days after his defeat, Enrique maintained hope that he could reverse his gloomy prospects with the help of his principal ally. This assurance was confirmed in the first few communications he received from Pere after Nájera. In the week after Enrique’s “misadventure,” the king comforted his former retainer with the saccharine hope that “God will turn your affairs so they will be to your honor.”

Despite this lukewarm intercession, the Aragonese ruler seemed much more interested in protecting his own realms than in living up to treaty commitments. Thus while offering Enrique the use of a Barcelona galley to make his escape, Pere absolutely refused to gather knights at Calatayud to support his ally’s attempt to re-assemble his scattered forces in the Soria region. Pere’s caution even extended to Enrique’s wife, who was now escorted out of Aragon, not for her protection, but for the kingdom’s. Even with the mixed signals that Pere was sending to him, Enrique had to hope against hope as he moved out of Castilian territory at Soria and across Aragon toward the central Pyrenean passes at Jaca. Safely in France by late-April, the royal fugitive again wrote Pere in May—this time not in a desperate drive to gain Aragonese military support, but to authorize his initial success in winning French aid and in promising an ultimate accounting for Pere if he failed to help his ally. After all, Enrique claimed, who had

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61 Ibid., 114; Russell, English Intervention, 114-5.


63 Ayala, 180 (2nd Year-Enrique, chap. 31; Pere III, 2:579 (VI:61); Zurita, Anales, 4:566-67 (IX:iibx).
done more than he to advance Pere’s honor and to defend him “from the evils and lies...of the traitor who now calls himself the king of Castile.”

Even when Enrique sent an envoy back into Aragon to plead his cause, Pere was in no mood for empty talk since the Black Prince still prowled through northern Spain and seemed “ready to approach our frontiers.” The fear that Pedro might unleash his triumphant mercenary on his old Aragonese adversary heightened Pere’s innate caution while spurring his well-learned sense of opportunism. He could not afford to offend the sitting Castilian king since that would surely bring down on his lands a destructive English chevauchée. Nor did he dare cut all ties with Enrique for fear of retaliation by his new confederate, Charles V of France (1364-1380). This dangerous balancing act was made even more dangerous by the rifts in his own realms. With the Aragonese still split between Trastámara and the now deceased Prince Ferran, the Catalans were vehemently opposed to all foreign alliances that threatened eastern Spain with continued warfare. Rather than collapsing into fearful inaction at the many-sided conundrum that faced him, however, Pere looked for the “profitable and honorable” in this complex situation by following the age-old mantra of Iberian kingship: survive and advance.

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68 David A. Cohen, “Secular Pragmatism and Thinking about War in Some Court Writings of Pere III El
Despite his vantage-point from the edge of the fray, Pere worked feverishly to maintain positive relations with the warring rulers of Castile. Receiving a letter from Enrique’s brother, Tello, in the late summer of 1367 that openly begged for Aragonese neutrality in the upcoming struggle with Pedro, Pere responded in his typical tone of non-committal caution by declaring “his pleasure in all of... [Enrique’s] good,” while affirming that his prime concern was “truth and loyalty.” Shortly afterwards, he continued this judicious fence-mending by writing his “brother,” the émigré king, to wish him great “life, health, and honor” while forwarding to him certain letters that had come into his hands which confirmed the unstable state of Castile after Nájera.

While Pere’s lukewarm, though ostensibly friendly communication with Enrique reflected the Aragonese king’s customary circumspection, it also betrayed his fear of Enrique’s newfound power in France. After being lavishly established in a chateau outside Narbonne in the spring of 1367, the Castilian emigrant had spent the summer in forming even closer ties to the French Crown by manipulating the influence of Charles V’s brother, Duke Louis of Anjou. When these efforts led to a secret accord with France confirmed at Aigues Mortes in August, Enrique was confident that the time had come to return to his homeland once

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69 Miret y Sans, “Négociations,” 123.

70 Ibid., 127.
more. Though having magnificently rebuilt his fortunes in just a few months, he seemed unwilling to forego his Aragonese alliance and so in early September again wrote Pere for his pledged military help.\textsuperscript{71} Pere, who had already concluded a truce with Pedro and promised to stop the flow of Enrique’s supporters across the Pyrenees was placed squarely in the center of a dangerous quandary.\textsuperscript{72} To escape this difficulty, he wrote back to Enrique informing him that he was currently involved in delicate talks with the Prince of Wales, and thus “begged and required him as a friend” not to re-enter Spain until mid-October when the initial truce with Pedro was set to expire.\textsuperscript{73} If he rashly launched an invasion before this, Pere would be “keen to stop him.” Enrique received this limp ultimatum with surprise and understandable anger. He reminded his former lord that he had never failed him and when in his service had won back “120 villages and castles” that Pedro had captured.\textsuperscript{74} With what he saw as Pere’s perfidy, Enrique considered his decade-long allegiance to an Aragonese feudal and diplomatic connection definitely at an end—at least for the moment.

Gathering an army of some 3,000 troops, including free companies under the famous French constable, Bertran du Gueselin, as well as battalions of Aragonese and Castilian volunteers, Enrique made his way across the Pyrenees at Andorra and through Navarrese

\textsuperscript{71} Ayala, 180-81 (2nd Year-Enrique, chaps. xxxi-xxxiii); Russell, \textit{English Intervention}, 127-28; Taggie, “Castillian Foreign Policy,” 374-75.

\textsuperscript{72} Antonio Gutiérrez de Velasco, “Los Ingleses en España (Siglo XIV),” \textit{Estudios de Edad Media de la Corona de Aragón} 4 (1951): 252.

\textsuperscript{73} Miret y Sans, “Négociations,” 127; Russell, \textit{English Intervention}, 129.

\textsuperscript{74} Ayala, 181-82 (2nd Year-Enrique, chap. xxxiv).
Donald J. Kagay

territory to the Aragonese village of Valvastro. Though Pere had made noisy preparations to gather an army at Zaragoza to meet this new threat, all of his plans came to nought since his people were sick of the constant warfare that had oppressed them for a decade and many of them were clearly in favor of Enrique’s cause.\(^75\) When “the Bastard” safely entered Castilian territory at Calahorra in late-September, the civil war entered its final and most dangerous phase which pitted most of Castile’s high clergy and towns against each other. Pere, now a distant witness to these events, could only wait for the struggle’s bloody conclusion while carefully standing between its protagonists.

III.

After their ten years of cross-border combat that had also involved them in an almost-constant propaganda war, the discussion of peace between Pere and Pedro seemed a base impossibility. With the miracle of Nájera, however, a truce between the old enemies seemed a prudent move to both. Thus, in the week after the battle, the victorious Castilian king sent two of his mercenary captains, Hugh de Calveley and William Elham, to Zaragoza where they laid the groundwork for “good friendship” between the perennial adversaries. The first step toward this goal was the declaration of a truce by July that would cease hostilities between Aragon and Castile down to Easter of the next year (April 8, 1368).\(^76\) Pere, who had been stunned by the disintegration of the “ancient ties” between Aragon and England to which the extended Iberian war would eventually lead was “overjoyed” at the

\(^75\)Ibid., 182 (2nd Year-Enrique, chap. xxxiv); Zurita, *Analect*, 4:566-67 (IX:lxx).

\(^76\)Ayala, 182 (2nd Year-Enrique, chap. xxxiv); Russell, *English Intervention*, 123; Taggie, “Castillian Foreign Policy,” 354.
prospect of peace along his western and southern frontiers as well as improved relations with England in the person of the great chivalric hero, the Black Prince.77

For his part, Pedro looked at the truce as a necessity that had to be in place so he could get on with the business of subduing his more immediate enemies. On August 20, 1367, he publicly announced that he had arranged for a temporary end to hostilities with the Crown of Aragon, and some six months later confirmed that “firm truces” were still in effect with the Aragonese.78 In light of the unstable Castilian situation that Pedro encountered with his victory at Nájera, war with Aragon was the last thing he needed. Throughout the spring and summer of 1367, he carried out the command he had given to his supporters before the great battle: “do the most evil and damage you can to all those who do not come out in my service.”79 Though losing his opportunity to topple his dangerous sibling, he waged a vicious war against his supporters, many of whom paid for their allegiance with their lives. He created a wave of refugees among the aristocrats and townsmen who fled to Aragon rather than remain in or enter his dangerous service. At the head of this army of fugitives was the great royal counselor and chronicler, Pero López de Ayala who had gone “in disservice with the traitor, the count.”80 Those unlucky enough not to escape Pedro’s

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78 Luis Vicente Díaz Martin, Itinerario de Pedro I de Castilla. Estudio y Regesta (Valladolid, 1975), 441, 449 (docs. 979, 1003).

79 Ibid., 429 (doc. 943).

80 Ibid., 433, 434, 437 (docs. 953, 959, 966. For Ayala’s career, see Fernán Pérez de Guzmán, Pen Portraits of
wroth—and this included Martin López de Córdoba (the Master of Calatrava) and a number of Castilian noblemen and women were executed in various ways. According to Pere, Pedro, while “evil in his first rule... was worse after the recovery of his land.” Even the Black Prince, sickened by his employer’s barbaric violence and broken promises for payment of salaries long in arrears, deserted Pedro and returned in the early-fall to his long-suffering wife at Bordeaux. Even with the departure of his hired English troops, Pedro, still freed martial concerns with Aragon, remained confidently defiant, promising “evil last years to... [Enrique] and the many traitors [who] aid him.”

While Pedro was caught in a smouldering insurrection that would burst into a full-blown civil war when Enrique returned to Castile in September, 1367, Pere had as his prime concern the protection of his borders from foreign attack and this meant that the maintenance of the truce fell more heavily on his shoulders than on Pedro’. He announced the truce with his arch-enemy on September 10, warning his subjects than any attack on Castilian citizens or territory would be tantamount to treason and could thus be punished by any of Pere’s men, no matter their rank. Thus, even minor violations of the war stoppage

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Ibid., 437, 440 (968, 978); Ayala, 178-79 (2nd Year-Enrique, chaps. xxvii-xxix); Zurita, Anales, 4:567 (IX:lx). 81

Pere III, 2:580 (VI:62). 82

Chandos Herald, 166; Villalon, “Spanish Involvement,” 48; Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, 221-22. 83

Díaz Martin, Itinerario, 443-44 (doc. 988). 84
Disposable Alliances would bring down on the violators the boundless threat of the king’s “ire and indignation.” Despite these stern warnings, Pere soon found that his citizens, especially those living on the frontier, could not so easily wean themselves from the profitable habit of war. Within weeks of the truce’s commencement, Aragonese raiding parties, large and small, composed of unnamed villagers as well as important aristocrats and churchmen, crossed into Castile for profit. These razzias unleashed manifold “scandals and dangers” on Castilian border settlements and paid for their adventures by “stealing horses, cows, and other beasts or good” from the largely defenseless countryside. To stop these isolated incidents from becoming dangerous provocations for Pedro, Pere commanded “strong remedies” for cross-border raiding, most especially the decapitation of the raiders who could be identified and arrested. When Aragon’s porous borders allowed Castilian forays to terrorize its frontier towns and villages, the king had to redouble his efforts to see that the violators were punished without angering Pedro. This he accomplished by even-handedly punishing both his own and Pedro’s subjects who had taken hostages, confiscated merchandise, or rustled livestock.

IV.

As his frontiers were overrun by mercenary forces serving the two men struggling for

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85ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1387, ff. 182v-183v.

86ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1219, f. 27; R. 1387, ff. 183v-184v; Miret y Sans, “Négociations,” 133; Gutiérrez de Velasco, “Ingleses,” 259-60.

87ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1387, ff. 185-186, 187, 191.
Donald J. Kagay

donald J. Kagay

the Castilian throne, Pere sought solutions to these mounting dangers among his own people. After so many years of war experience, the king, like his illustrious predecessor, Jaume I (1214-1276), knew that matters of defense could only be effectively carried out in the arena of parliament. Thus, shortly after Nájera, Pere informed his principal clergy, aristocrats, and townsmen in his easternmost realm that Enrique’s defeat had made it “necessary for... [the sovereign] to reinforce his power” by summoning a Catalan corts at Lérida for April 25, 1367. This meeting, which “pertain ed to the defense and good standing” of Catalonia did not finally materialize until October 15 when Pere convened a corts generals at Villafranca de Penedes. Taking his opening speech to the body as an opportunity to announce his truce with Pedro once more, the Aragonese king reminded the members of the assembly that the war with Castile was not over and he depended on them as “good and loyal natural vassals” to maintain their vigilance against the dangerous situation or Catalonia and the entire Crown of Aragon might fall into as civil war raged in Castile.

Since the danger emanating from the Castilian civil war was to continue for over two

88 The Book of Deeds of James I of Aragon: A Translation of the Medieval Catalan Llibre dels Feyts, trans. Damian Smith and Helena Buffery (Aldershot, Hampshire, 2003), 286-87 (chaps. 381-82). Though Jaume knew that he had to call out parliaments to get support for his wars, he was also frustrated since the members of these assemblies were invariably “divided in opinion... [and] could never be made to agree.”

89 ACA, Cancellaría real, R. 1217, f. 145; Miret y Sans, “Négociations,” 113. The king convened an Aragonese corts at Tamarite de Litera on February 20, 1367 and then prorogued it until September for Zaragoza, but this assembl has left no record that it dealt with Enrique’s invasion [Cortes del reino de Aragón 1357-1451: Extractos y fragmentos de procesos desaparecidos, ed. Angel Sesma Muñoz and Esteban Sarasa Sánchez (Valencia, 1976), 63-74.

90 Cortes de los antiguos reinos de Aragón y de Valencia y principado de Cataluña [CAVC], ed. Fidel Fita y Colomé and Bienvenido Oliver y Estreller, 27 vols. (Madrid, 1896-1922), 2:495, 492-93. For the royal use of the parliamentary “opening speech” (praepositum) for stirring support among the members of the assembly, see Suzanne F. Cawsey, Kingship and Propaganda: Royal Eloquence and the Crown of Aragon c 1200-1450 (Oxford, 2002).
years, Pere had occasion in 1370 to once more turn to the Catalans for help at Tarragona. After reminding the participants in the meeting of his duty as a “just, wise, and prudent leader” and an “ardent...and brave defender” as well as their obligations as “loyal, ready, and obedient retainers,” Pere called for the vote of troops, armor, provisions, and other supplies from the parliamentary estates so he could beat back the intermittent assaults of “the great multitude of highwaymen and robbers who have risen in the world.”

The forces, consisting of 300 armored knights, 400 men-at-arms, and the same number of crossbowmen would be recruited and paid for by the corts for the next two years. Despite the king’s bombast, this small company could do little more than patrol his northern Aragonese frontiers in the vain hope of keeping the streams of mercenaries moving to and fro across the Pyrenees from violating the borders of Per’s exposed realms.

Even with this corporate attempt at reinforcing regnal security, Pere soon fell back on the service of his far-flung administrators as the front line of defense. As Enrique’s French supporters continued to stream across the Pyrenees throughout 1367 and 1368, Pere attempted to have each of his officials (many of whom also functioned as frontier captains) divert the great companies away from his lands without creating a major diplomatic incident. In September, 1367 when Enrique’s invasion was in the offing, the Aragonese king wrote his son, Joan, with sage advise about how to frustrate the invaders. Counseling him to gather a sizeable force by invoking *Princeps namque*, he advised his first-born to dog the invaders so

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91 *CAVC*, 3:47, 50-51.
thoroughly that they would suffer a “great lack of victuals.” Despite the provocations he might suffer or the chance for glorious victory that the passage of the mercenary troops represented, Joan was warned to avoid openly confronting the invaders.93

This hand-cuffed style of defense characterized the nature of Aragonese defense for the next year. The first phase of Pere’s strategy consisted of establishing a loosely-connected line of defense around the passes of Jaca. Since he was strapped for cash, Pere formed frontier forces from town militias who had to serve at their own expense under the “penalty of fealty.”94 The principal thrust of Aragonese planning, however, was not to engage Enrique’s troops, but rather to prevent them from easily acquiring supplies. He attempted to accomplish this through the efforts of individual units, but also by sweeping the Ebro “between Escatron and Zaragoza” of all boats “good and bad, small and great” that might have served as enemy grain transports.95 Never one to lose an opportunity to gain unpaid service from his subjects, Pere instructed several of his Catalan frontier towns to engage in massive fortification projects. He spurred on this work by constantly reminding the townsmen that those sites without stout defenses would be burned to the ground by the

92Ibid., 3:64

93ACA, Cancellería real, R. 1218, f. 9; Miret y Sans, “Négociations,” 128; Russell, English Intervention, 128-29. For the use of Princeps namque, article 64 of Catalonia’s traditional law, the Usatges of Barcelona, which mandated the aid of all men of fighting age whenever the Barcelona ruler suffered a foreign ruler, see The Usatges of Barcelona: The Fundamental Law of Catalonia, trans. Donald J. Kagay (Philadelphia, 1994), 80 (art. 64); Donald J. Kagay, “The National Defense Clause and the Emergence of the Catalan State: Princeps namque Revisited,” in War, study I, pp. 57-97; Manuel Sánchez Martínez, “The Invocation of Princeps namque in 1368 and its Repercussions for the City of Barcelona,” in Hundred Years War, 297-329.

94ACA, Cancellería real, R. 1387, ff. 188, 198.

95ACA, Cancellería real, R. 1387, f. 186.
Disposable Alliances

While tending to the survival of his lands with these governmental measures, Pere increasingly turned to a realm perfectly fitted to his crafty nature—international diplomacy. Thus, as the Castilian situation grew more fluid and unpredictable, the Aragonese king chanced the dangers inherent in foreign alliances both to seek protection for his own lands and gain profit from a fallen Castile.

V.

Until 1366, Pere III’s diplomatic stance to the rest of the Iberian Peninsula was a consistent one. He was engaged in a decade-long war with his “principal adversary,” Pedro I of Castile. To survive this conflict, the Aragonese ruler utilized the military talents of all sorts, including that of Pedro’s half-brother, Enrique de Trastámara. When his Castilian captain took control of his homeland, Pere supported him in exchange for the grant of a number of important Castilian border settlements. Enrique reneged on this agreement on the pretext that his parliament would not allow such a grant which would lessen the royal patrimony.97 Furious at this violation of good faith, Pere looked for new allies among the horde of political opportunists produced by the vagaries of the Hundred Years War. When Pedro returned to Spain at the head of an army actually commanded by the Black Prince that

96ACA, Cancellería real, R. 1387, ff. 192, 193v-95v.

defeated the “traitor of a count” at Nájera and Enrique himself then came back into his homeland with a French force led by Bertran du Guesclin, Pere might have been expected to man his frontiers while waiting for the muddled situation to clear. Instead, he displayed how much of an opportunist he himself could be by engaging in simultaneous negotiations with England, France, Navarre, and Portugal in an attempt to fashion a “final solution” for Castile, from which he would grow immensely in wealth and regional power. At age forty-eight in the year of the great battle, Pere was the senior statesman in a group both famous and notorious for its courage and greed. These leaders included the English heir, Edward, the Black Prince (1330-1376), his younger brother, John of Gaunt. Duke of Lancaster (1340-1399), Charles V of France (r. 1364-1380), Carlos II of Navarre (r 1349-1387), Pedro I of Portugal (r 1357-1367), and his son, Fernão I (1367-1383).

Pere’s relationship with this coterie of ambitious leaders overlapped because of their own political connections to the two men fighting to be Castilian king. Despite his own opportunistic nature and that of his erstwhile allies, their diplomatic endeavors bracketing Nájera were largely ineffectual. Pere’s aims, even in the midst of these international storms, were generally consistent. He wanted to lay his hands on the Castilian territory promised him in 1366 by Enrique and then to encourage the dismemberment of Castile, from which he would also take a royal profit. To accomplish these goals, he leaned away from his old retainer and toward his long-time enemy and his English handlers.

98 Díaz Martin, Itinerario, 431 (doc. 948).

99 For ages of these leaders in 1366, see Miret y Sans, “Négociations,” 121, n. 2.
After Nájera, Pere’s relations with Pedro were dictated by his victory over his half-brother, but also because an important segment of the Aragonese court was bitterly disposed against Enrique. In May, 1367, Pere allowed Pedro’s ambassadors, Calveley and Elham, to travel freely through Aragon to meet him at Zaragoza. During this first meeting, discussions between Pere and the English envoys led both sides to believe that further talks could be profitable. It was hoped that “differences between the kings of Castile and Aragon might be settled” and a working alliance established between Pere and the Black Prince. To test the diplomatic waters further, he sent two envoys to Burgos, but was initially stunned by the ostensibly bellicose attitude of the duke of Lancaster. He eventually read between the lines, however, and rather than perceiving a disintegration of the “ancient ties” between Aragon and England, perceived a true opportunity for the advancement of both realms.

Keeping his frontier towns on alert throughout May, he informed his first-born in early June that an Aragonese delegation was established in the small outpost of Moros outside Calatayud and a Castilian one in the tiny village of Deza above Ariza. Despite the

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100 Zurita, Anales, 4:562 (IX:lxix).
101 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1220, f. 68v; Gutiérrez y Velasco, “Ingleses,” 241.
102 Zurita, Anales, 4:562 (IX:lxix).
103 Ibid. The two Aragonese ambassadors were Ramón de Peguera and Jaime de Ezfar.
104 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1220, ff. 88-89; Gutiérrez y Velasco, “Ingleses,” 245.
widespread fear of a large English force encamped on the verge of Aragonese territory and the flurry of rumors that “the English had entered the hamlets of Calatayud and inflicted great damage [on them],” Pere persisted in his drive for an English alliance and encouraged the next stage of negotiations that took place at Tarazona in August. With the truce between Aragon and Castile finally worked out by mid-month, the ambassadors moved to establish “peace and friendship between Pere and Edward. Drawn in the broadest possible terms, the agreement bound the Aragonese king to stop all aid to Enrique and tied the Black Prince to the dire promise of war against Pedro unless he made good on promised territories and unpaid military salaries. To bring stability to the fluid situation, the prince suggested that Pedro contract another marriage in an attempt to produce a legitimate male heir. In order to enhance the possibility of success for such a scheme Edward offered to serve as a regent for such an offspring. In effect, the bare outlines of a coalition hostile to both contenders for the Castilian kingship would now emerge. This extended set of alliances, which eventually expanded to include the sovereigns of Navarre and Portugal, seemed ready to threaten an Iberian balance of power in place for decades, but, as sixteenth-century chronicler, Jeronimo Zurita, would observe, the web of conspiracy spun by Pere and

106 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1221, f. 17v; Gutiérrez y Velasco, “Ingleses,” 250.


109 Taggie, “Castillian Foreign Policy,” 349.
the Black Prince would eventually “come to nothing.”

As the fall of 1367 witnessed the return of Enrique to Spain and the intensification of the civil war, such predictions of diplomatic inanity would have seemed totally out of touch with the obvious fact of a Castile spinning to pieces. Pere was determined to continue the work of Tarazona, but when negotiations concerning Castilian affairs commenced once more in October, 1367 at the French city of Tarbes their scope had increased with the addition of Navarrese and Castilian delegations. Pedro’s envoys were clearly on the outside looking in when they swore for their master to keep all earlier agreements, territorial and monetary, with the Black Prince and attempted to arrange a marriage between Pedro’s daughter, Constanza, and Pere’s first-born, Joan. Despite the presence of Castilian ambassadors in this conclave, the Aragonese, English, and Navarrese ambassadors conducted secret talks designed to enforce peace at the expense of both Castilian rulers. To end the civil war and settle all the domestic and foreign disputes it had spawned, the principal members of the Tarbes assembly ordered the warring half-brothers to respond to the meeting’s offer to arbitrate their differences. With little possibility that either of the siblings would accept this offer, the assembly seemed to be acting to justify the joint Aragonese, English, Navarrese plan for the “conquest [and division] of the lands and kingdoms of Castile.”

110 Zurita, Anales, 4:563 (IX:lxix).

Even as the Tarbes meeting broke up in the late-fall of 1367, Pere continued to press the English to finalize their alliance. In December, the diplomatic discussions continued at Bordeaux between the Aragonese envoys and the Black Prince.\footnote{Zurita, \textit{Anales}, 4:576 (IX:lxii); Russell, \textit{English Intervention}, 137; Gutiérrez y Velasco, “Ingleses,” 263-64.} Because of the prince’s limited standing in making agreements that fully bound the English government, Pere was obliged to have these accords agreed to by his new ally’s father, Edward III of England (1327-1377). While this formality was ultimately settled in early 1368 when two of Pere’s ambassadors traveled to London, the English king showed little of his sons’ enthusiasm for Iberian affairs.\footnote{ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1082, f. 12; Russell, \textit{English Intervention}, 137; Gutiérrez y Velasco, “Ingleses,”  264-65. The Aragonese envoys were Francesç de Santclement and Bertran de Vall.}

In the next year, however, he was called to answer for the Black Prince’s sworn agreements and rash actions when an ambassador from Pedro entered the English court on February 24, 1369 demanding responses from Edward for a set of “petitions and requests” he presented in the name of his royal master. Though he had been represented at Tarbes in 1367, the harried contender for the Castilian throne was obviously uneasy about the mere fact of negotiations between an English prince and an Aragonese king. The points he ordered raised with the English ruler focused on the status of the “treaty, alliance, and peaces” that had bound him to the Black Prince for three years. Edward assured Pedro’s minion that this relationship still remained solidly in force, but refused to commit to the discussed nuptials between their children. This air of cool neutrality was also apparent in the English response to the Castilian demand for a “subsidy... [to confront] his enemies” as well
as Pedro’s complaint about the prince’s growing “rancor and hatred” toward all things Castilian. Edward, surely with some heat, responded through his representatives that he had already sent his sons into Iberia “for the recovery of [Pedro’s] realms and lands” and that his first-born’s anger with the Castilian king would dissolve as soon as he received the territories and military salaries promised him. The only Castilian petition that Edward considered “in harmony with reason” was Pedro’s demand for a final accounting for all the expenses the Black Prince had incurred during and after the Nájera campaign.  

All of Pedro’s concerns with the English and all other foreign and domestic matters became moot in a month when the older Castilian king was cut to pieces on March 23, 1369 outside the fortress of Montiel by a small force commanded by his half-brother. Despite Pedro’s bloody demise, the Castilian civil war raged on and English-Aragonese plans for the partition of the central Iberian realm continued. Following up on marriage discussions engaged in after the conclusion of the Tarbes conference, Pere constituted two “certain and special procurators” on September 23, 1369 who principal duty was the completion of nuptial arrangements between the Aragonese princess, Joanna, and the English prince, Edmund of Langley, earl of Cambridge. Besides these familial concerns, the Aragonese

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114 Gutiérrez y Velasco, “Ingleses,” 268-70; Taggie, “Castilian Foreign Policy,” 379-82. The Castilian envoy was Juan Gutiérrez.


ambassadors carried the latest version of proposals for a final diplomatic settlement. Pere and the Black Prince had been fine-tuning these articles since the Tarbes meeting had adjourned, but the intermittent raids of men-at-arms across his frontiers had led the Aragonese ruler to insist from the English prince the completion of the “good confederation and love” discussed so extensively at Tarbes. By the chapters of the document presented in 1369, Pere, Carlos II, and the Black Prince promised that they would not “aggrieve, damage, or invade by land or sea” each other’s territories nor would they allow the “deceit and fraud” of their subjects in doing so. This alliance of convenience was clearly directed against a Castilian landscape wracked by civil war. To assure that the weakness of the nation’s surviving king, Enrique, after Montiel, the agreement forbade the alliance of any of the confederates without the express consent of the others. As a matter of fact, all pacts that touched on southern France and northern Spain would be subject to such approval. The core of the 1369 accords focused on the fate of a future Castile that would be subdivided by the surrender of promised territories to the major signatories and the establishment of Pedro I of Portugal as the sovereign of a much reduced Castilian kingdom. Each of the new Iberian suzerains established by the agreement would be responsible for the conquest and the defense of the land assigned them, but each could call on their allies for help if they so desired. Once this conquest had taken place, the new masters of Spain’s largest state could claim a bloody “right of conquest” or arrange or arrange for a “friendly concord or agreement” with the kingdom’s nobility. The troop levels assigned to each of the confederates—between 1000 to 1500 men-at-arms and archers—reveal how unrealistic the
Disposable Alliances

entire project was.\footnote{ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 206-11; Gutiérrez Velasco, “Ingleses,” 266-67, 270-75. Pere was to get Murcia, Alicante, Velez, Riquea, Moya, Conca, Huepre, Corita de las Canes, Valldolinas, Saliners, Pareja, Alcocer, Penyalver, Penyalen, Fita, Guadalimar, Brihuega, Les Penyes de Viana, Tihuencas, Siguença, Molina, Medinaceli, Atiença, Barlanga, Santestrena, Gormaç, Ahylon, Cararena, Madervolo, Aranda de Duero, Osma, Almanzan, Benamaça, Moros, Seron, Montagut, Deça, Cihuels, Gomera, Alcacer, Soria, Cabreras, Sant Leonard, Agreda, Cervera, and Cernago. This grant included the “castles, places, and hamlets” connected to the larger settlements.}

Despite the surreal nature of these diplomatic settlements, Aragonese and English leader would remain bound to them for a decade after Nájera. Neither side, it seemed, could accept the loss of territory or cash long owed them by Enrique or Pedro.\footnote{Masiá de Ros, Relación, 1:355.} While the Black Prince steadily seemed to lose interest in Iberia after the end of the Castilian civil war, his brother, John of Gaunt, emerged as important figure in the Peninsula after 1379 when he took as his bride, Princess Constanza, the orphaned daughter of Pedro I\footnote{Gutiérrez de Velasco, “Ingleses,” 270; Russell, English Intervention, 168; Norman F. Cantor, The Last Knight: The Twilight of the Middle Ages and the Birth of the Modern Era (New York, 2004), 78; Luis Suárez Fernández, “The Atlantic and Mediterranean among the Objectives of the House of Trastámara,” in Spain in the Fifteenth century 1369-1516: Essays and Extracts by Historians of Spain, ed. Roger Highfield, trans. Frances M. López-Morillas (New York, 1972), 60-66.}, Though the couple spent very little time together, Lancaster was determined to advance his wife’s claim to the Castilian throne.\footnote{Russell, English Intervention, 173-74. By Pedro’s will, Constanza and “he with whom she would marry” would inherit Castile.} By 1373, he attempted to attain this goal by resurrecting the English-Aragonese confederation that had last seen the diplomatic light of day four years earlier. Pere was happy to support Lancaster’s plans provided he received the long list of cities and towns he had been promised in 1369. To assure English success in any future
invasion of Castile, the Aragonese ruler pledged free passage for English troops through his lands and swore he would add 1500 men-at-arms to the invading force.\textsuperscript{121} Such a force would not materialize, but England remained stoutly anti-Castilian into the next decade, while largely supporting its old partners in conspiracy, Aragon, Navarre, and Portugal.

VI.

Pere’s efforts to tie England to Aragon in a coalition that would weaken or even destroy Castile bound both partners to the instability and greed of two other Iberian dynasties: Portugal and Navarre. As the War of the Two Pedros bled into the Castilian civil war, the rulers of these smaller states engaged in well-placed diplomacy in an attempt to profit from the conflicts of its larger neighbors.

While Portugal went through considerable domestic unrest during the reigns of Pedro I and of his son, Fernão (1367-1383), it largely maintained peace with its principal rival and foreign threat, Castile. When it seemed at the point of spinning apart, however, the Portuguese rulers began to position themselves for any territory that might fall their way by deepening diplomatic relations with Aragon. On July 8, 1360, Pere sent a “special procurator and ambassador” to the Portuguese court to gain from Afonso “treaties, agreements, settlements, and pacts.” Attaining nothing substantive from Pedro of Portugal by these talks, the Aragonese sovereign was content to obtain from his “beloved relative” an open-ended promise to “aid, support, and succor... [him] against the king of Castile, his

people and lands.” Even when these proved little more than paper promises, Pere, who was by then determined to hem in Castile with linked alliances, began marriage negotiations with his Portuguese counterpart in 1365. In the following summer when Enrique has already first made good his claim to the Castilian throne, the Aragonese sovereign tried again to establish “peace and friendship” with Pedro of Portugal. This relationship would be cemented by a betrothal of Pere’s daughter, Joanna, to the Portuguese crown prince, Fernão. This nuptial agreement was to carry with it the generous dowry of 50,000 libras. These arrangements were not secret and the Aragonese delegation diverted its journey to inform Enrique and his wife of these impending plans as they traveled through Castile to the Portuguese court. Though this union never took place, it was symbolic of Pere’s determination to bring about a viable alliance with Iberia’s westernmost kingdom.

With the death of the Portuguese king and the accession of Fernão in January, 1367, Portugal became a much more active player in the game whose rules had been set by Pere and the Black Prince. Sending a delegation to the Tarbes conference, the Portuguese heir pledged his support to the anti-Enrique coalition, even going so far as to supply the Aragonese king with salary for 1500 lances for “as long as the war and the conquest would

122 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 68v-69. The Aragonese ambassador was Pedro Boil, the general bailiff of the kingdom of Valencia.

123 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 86v-87.

124 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 129r-v.
In exchange for aid that would eliminate both of the current Castilian rulers, the confederation swore to support Fernão’s claim the Castilian throne. The drive to maintain these rickety diplomatic structures continued unabated until 1370 when Pere arranged for a marriage settlement between Fernão and the Aragonese princess, Leonore, who was already betrothed to Enrique’s son, Juan. While this strange Aragonese-Portuguese union demonstrated quite clearly Fernão’s opportunism, fueled by the hope that a part of Castile might fall under his control with almost no effort on his part. It also showed Pere’s determination to make good his claim to Castilian territories promised to him three times down to 1369. This shady alliance would hardly stay in place for a year; by March, 1371 after his realm had suffered months of Castilian land and naval assaults, Fernão had deserted the anti-Castilian coalition to conclude with Enrique a peace treaty, in which the Portuguese king renounced his claims to the Castilian crown. When Fernão died without a legitimate male heir in 1383, however, even this alliance crumbled in the wake of a Castilian invasion and defeat at Aljubarrota (August 15, 1385) and the emergence of a new dynasty under João I (1385-1433).

125 Russell, English Intervention, 155.
126 Ibid., 154-55.
128 Valdeon Baruque, Enrique II, 235; Masiá de Ros, Relación, 1:333-34.
While Portuguese affairs often seemed outside Pere’s knowledge and beyond his control, those of Navarre were of crucial importance to both Aragon and Castile because it controlled the Pyrenean passes that both Enrique and Pedro depended on in receiving French or English help. In the sovereign of Navarre, Carlos II “the Bad,” Pere found a military leader almost as mediocre as himself, but a diplomat as crafty and ruthless as he ever was. As a grandson of Louis X (1314-1316) and first cousin of Philip VI (1328-1350), the heir to Navarre, as the holder of a number of strategically important, northern French territories, was also a contender for the Gallic throne. In the stormy decade after the battle of Crécy (1346), Carlos changed sides several times between the French and English adversaries whose family disputes eventually led to the Hundred Years War. Escaping from his first imprisonment in 1358, the Navarrese adventurer eventually sold his services to the highest bidder, the French monarchy, and was instrumental in putting down the massive urban uprising of Paris and the peasant insurrection of northern France, the Jacquerie.131

The “volatile and land-hungry” Pyrenean king was constantly attempting to expand his territorial control, most often by the age-old method of diplomatic conspiracy.132 In

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132 For this characterization, see Russell, English Intervention, 125.
1359, he entered into negotiations with Edward III that attempted to arrange the partition of France between them. In exchange for his military support of and allegiance to Edward as the next French king, Carlos would add Champagne, Brie, Chartres, and Normandy to his already extensive portfolio of Gallic holdings. While this amazingly bold scheme would never come to fruition, it set the stage for Charles’s role in Iberian negotiations just as monumental in their dimensions.

After this record of unbounded ambition in northern France, Carlos shifted his focus southward into his strategically placed, Pyrenean realm and into the Iberian lands it overlooked. From the first year of his conflict with Pedro, Pere saw the Navarrese ruler as political wild card whose possible alliance with Castile could open a disastrous second front against Aragon and Castile.

Thanks to Cabera’s behind-the-scenes efforts, Pere was eventually able to attain on August 25, 1363 at Unicastillo the first of a number of secret accords with Navarre’s sovereign. Caught between the French and Castilians, Carlos was more than willing to confront Pedro, provided several extremely expensive conditions were met. Agreeing to an nuptial agreement that would tie the Navarrese princess, Juana, to the Aragonese crown prince and perennial bridegroom, Joan, Pere promised to pay Carlos 200,000 florins in the period between All Saints Day (November 1, 1363) and January 1, 1364 as well as a monthly stipend of 21,000 florins through the next year. In exchange for this generous outlay, the

133Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War II: Trial by Fire (Philadelphia, 1999), 400-1.

134ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 54r-v. As early as 1357, Pere was urging his principal adviser, Bernat de Cabrera, to open diplomatic relations with Carlos.
Disposable Alliances

Navarrese king was to “do all the damage he could against Castile “by all methods possible.” When they had dispatched Castile, the Aragonese ruler would aid his ally against France with the grant of 1000 men-at-arms for the upcoming winter and 500 for the next summer. This alliance, which was entered into “against everyone, no matter how great and strong,” was guaranteed, with the exchange of castles and hostages, “in good faith and understanding and without evil deceit.”

Despite the earnest exchange of brotherhood pledges that bound the sovereigns of Aragon and Navarre, each soon came to understand that his partner had no intention of carrying out their promises. In March, 1364, they tried to formalize their alliance with the exchange of hostages and other sureties. Though clearly distrusting each other, they concluded another secret pact in 1365 to let Trastámara’s mercenaries pass through Navarre and into Castile. Never one to be held to his agreements, Carlos entered into another treaty in August, 1366 with Pedro and his new English backers to allow free passage for their invading army in exchange for two of Castile’s northernmost territories. This treacherous change in direction was accompanied by a dramatic volte-face some months later when the shifty Navarrese king accepted a large sum of money and the grant of the Castilian frontier settlement of Logroño in exchange for his promise to keep the passes closed to Pedro’s

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Six months later, Carlos, already a distrusted vassal to three sovereigns, met with the Black Prince, and his brother, John of Gaunt. Under their joint pressure, he relented and opened the passes for Pedro’s hired army in the early winter of 1367. As the result of Carlos’s double-dealing, few of his former allies were ready to trust him again.

For his part, Pere, whose lands bordered Navarre and the danger of foreign invasion it represented, had to retain his connection with Carlos, no matter how faithless he had already proven himself. In June, 1366, when his Navarrese ally was signing a treaty with Pedro, Pere sent ambassadors to Carlos’s court to negotiate yet another “friendship, agreement, confederation...[between the two kings] that would last forever.” To complete the “full and firm friendship,” the negotiators were charged to remove “every occasion of rancor and unfriendliness” between Pere and Carlos. Once their amity was made “true, pure, clear, and equal” between them, the long-term accomplices were to declare formally their joint support for Enrique. Within two months of this self-seeking declaration of friendship and fair-dealing, the rulers of Aragon and Navarre were approaching the boundary of a general war between their realms.

In the fall of 1366, Carlos’s chamberlain led a large army across the pass of

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138 Ayala, 159 (18th year, chap. 1; Sumption, Trial, 548.


140 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 121r-v. The Aragonese envoys were Francesc Roma, doctor of laws and vice-chancellor; Lopede Gorrea, knight; and Berenguer de Prats, doctor of law.

141 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 121v-122v.
Roncesvalles and besieged the first major Aragonese outpost they encountered: Jaca. After their siege of the town was beaten off. The motley Navarrese-English force “robbed and sacked” the district before crossing the mountains to safety. Almost immediately, one of Aragon’s frontier captains, Luis Cornel, led a raid into Navarre that occupied itself with widespread rustling. On September 26, an astounded Pere wrote his erstwhile ally, demanding an explanation of why his men had made such a “public display of robbery.” The furious king called for “satisfaction and recompense,” and if this was not forthcoming, he himself would apply a “suitable remedy” to the situation. Carlos responded in the next month to claim that he was the injured party and that “great damage” had already been done his lands by foreign companies “wishing to leave Spain by the passes of Navarre.” As far as the raids on Aragon were concerned, he admitted that they had occurred, but not that he had ordered them. After this exchange of bombast, the angry neighbors relented and decided to fall back on the agreements “by which we are bound.”

Despite his machinations before the Nájera campaign and his shameful antics to avoid war service for one or the other of his battling allies, Carlos survived the damage to his realm that had long served as a highway for the great companies, and emerged as one of the royal onlookers who, like Pere and the Black Prince, were happy to turn Castilian

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142 Zurita, Anales, 4:552-53 (IX:lxxvi).
143 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, f. 142.
144 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 143r-v.
145 Ayala, 159 (2nd Year-Enrique, chap. I); Chandos Herald, 156; Sumption, Trial, 549.
disorder to their own advantage. Thus when English and Aragonese diplomats began arranging for the dismemberment of Iberia’s largest realm throughout the fall of 1367, the Navarrese king was more than happy to participate, sending ambassadors to the bargaining sessions at Tarazona, Ariza, and Tarbes.\(^{146}\) As Castile fell into civil war for the next two years, Navarre and its alliance partners continued negotiations. Thoroughly occupied with French affairs during this period, Carlos delegated his much-traveled wife, Juana, as his representative to general meetings of the coalition or to sessions between individual members.\(^{147}\)

Between April, 1369 and February, 1370, Aragonese and Navarrese ambassadors met to hammer out agreements between their masters. As with their earlier secret treaties, the kings pledged they would be “friends of [their] friends and enemies of [their] enemies. As with liege vassals, however, they provided a list of exceptions to the newly proclaimed alliance; namely those parties that one or the other of the principals would not declare war against in the name of the pact. The principal thrust of the agreement was to promise joint military action against the sole remaining Castilian king, Enrique. Carlos, surely with some hesitation agreed to provide 4000 horsemen for their master if Pere commenced an offensive war in Castilian territory and to answer in short order his ally’s call for help if Aragon happened to be invaded by their common enemy. Acting to control their involvement in war, the new partners also attempted to regulate the advancement of peace in

\(^{146}\) ACA, Cancellaria real, R. 1219, f. 82; Miret y Sans, “Négociations,” 133-34; Russell, *English Intervention*, 125.

Disposable Alliances

the region by requiring the unanimous consent of the signatories before any cessation of hostilities. The new pact between Pere and Carlos was formally accepted before large assemblies of the great men of Aragon and Navarre in Tarazona and Tudela. In it, the kings and witnesses bound themselves to these chapters under “the penalty of treason and the sentence of excommunication.”

These accords were adapted to the general “confederation and love” established in September, 1369 under the leadership of Pere and the Black Prince. Naverre, like the other members of the confederation could not make peace with Enrique unless all the members agreed to do so. No matter what Castilian territory Carlos conquered, he would have to defend it by sending contingents of men-at-arms across the frontier in numbers to be agreed on later. He could not, however, make “unjust war” against his allies unless he was willing to undergo their just military response. Carlos was also bound to allow the passage across the Pyrenees of yet another English invasion. If he refused to open his passes, Pere would permit this military movement through the Pyrenean defile above Jaca.

Despite or perhaps because of his negotiated plans for Enrique’s realm, Pere was careful to make public his intention of maintaining the peace with the Castilian ruler. This was born out in 1371 when he told one of his frontier captains, “we have neither the heart

148 Ibid., 1:334; 2:565-69 (doc. 246/2). The Navarrese envoy in this negotiation was Juan Crozat, doctor of Roman law and dean of Tudela.

149 ACA, Cancelloría real, R. 1293, ff. 207, 209r-v.
not the will to wage war on Castile.\footnote{ACA, Cancelleria real, R. 1230, f. 125v; Russell, \textit{English Intervention}, 162.} While on one level, this reflects a heartfelt exhaustion on the part of the Aragonese king whose country had been on a war footing for the last fifteen years, it also reflects a form of diplomatic doublespeak that was clearly disproven by the negotiations he would engage in for the next three years with Navarre and the Duke of Lancaster. With the English prince’s assumption of his older brother’s place in Gascony and his clear opening into Iberian affairs with the marriage to Constanza, he emerged as a new power on the southern French scene that drew both Aragon and Navarre into his orbit.\footnote{Goodman, \textit{John}, 7-8, 48.}

For several years after the Castilian civil war ended in 1369, Pere and Carlos attempted to use their alliances with England as a kind of battering ram against Castile. By this strategy, they hoped for the complete disintegration of their larger, often menacing neighbor. Failing at this, they might still harbor the hope of actually laying their hands on the grants of Castilian territory they had been promised in diplomatic accords for the past decade. These expectations were thus clearly in play when Pere sent an envoy to his diplomatic partners in the spring of 1374. Through his representative, Ramón Almany de Cervelló, Pere asked his slippery Navarrese ally what his final intentions were in regard to Castile and did he think that Enrique would remain in his homeland or “go into France to mix with the men of French.” The latter was surely a hopeful query since in the next breath the Aragonese sovereign spoke of the danger hanging over their two realms and asked
Carlos to agree to a defensive alliance that would be solidified by a marriage between his much-pledged, daughter, Leonore and the Navarrese crown prince. He then tempted his largely faithless ally with the prediction that in the present year they “would see if the kingdom of Castile would remain to Enrique or not.” This dire forecast was also reflected in Pere’s diplomatic instructions of the same period concerning John of Gaunt. Emphasizing that he wanted to maintain “good peace, concord, and friendship” with the English prince, the Aragonese ruler quickly turned to the problems he assumed would arise with Lancaster’s projected conquest of Castile. He insisted that if Gaunt recognized Aragon’s right to all the lands Enrique had granted him in a “public letter,” he would formally recognize an English conquest of Castile and support it in every way possible.

In fact, the discussion of 1374 marked the end of the coalition that had tied Aragon and Navarre to England’s Iberian aspirations since 1367. Lancaster remained an important figure in the Peninsula, but would increasingly focus his efforts on Portuguese affairs. As this English storm subsided, Aragon and Navarre had no choice but to seek an independent peace with Castile and her principal ally, France. Pere would ultimately accomplish his goal; Carlos would not.

VIII.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Pere’s ambition was often matched by his caution.

\[152\text{ Russell, } \text{English Intervention}, \text{ 562-63 (app. IV).}\]

\[153\text{ Ibid., 563-65.}\]

\[154\text{ Goodman, } \text{John}, \text{ 111-38; Russell, } \text{English Intervention}, \text{ 184, 357-447, 556-57 (doc. 2).}\]
Donald J. Kagay

These linked qualities often propelled the Aragonese sovereign into conspiracies with England, Navarre, and Portugal that aimed at the total destruction or fatal weakening of Castile; they also led him to hedge his diplomatic bets by openly working to establish peaceful ties with England’s principal enemy, France. This action flew in the face of recent history marked by repeated struggles between Aragon and the house of Anjou as well as a strong naval alliance between France and Castile that had repeatedly wreaked damage on England’s Provençal littoral during the early 1350s. Forces unleashed in the War of the Two Pedros, however, threatened to shift the diplomatic poles in a radical manner. Within the first few weeks of the conflict, the beleaguered Aragonese king wrote Jean II to complain of Pedro’s faithless action “in waging war, assaults, and invasions on the frontier of... his [Pere’s] land.” He assured the French sovereign that Francesch de Perellós, his trusted counselor and the selfsame privateer whose raids had sparked the war, would soon travel to France as Pere’s envoy. While this mission did open discussions between the two kings, its principal effect was to station Perillós as a virtual resident ambassador in the French court. In this role, he was responsible for countering Castilian propaganda that might


156 Sumption, *Trial*, 52-57, 63-80.

157 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, f. 46v.

158 See note 8.
By 1362, when Pere was feeling the financial strain of maintaining frontier forces for years on end, Perillós was again useful in presenting to Jean the possibility of an alliance of mutual defense. The French listened and, not at all convinced that Aragon would live up to its end of the bargain, temporized. Despite this purposeful French foot-dragging, Pere and his ambassador repeatedly presented the case for a French-Aragonese alliance over the next several years. In 1364, Pere took another tack by instructing Perillós to commence discussions “in a very secret manner” with the new French king, Charles V. By these clandestine negotiations, the Aragonese hoped for an “alliance of good love and concord” that would bind them in an imperialistic war against Navarre. These talks, though largely futile, brought a new character on the diplomatic scene, Duke Louis of Anjou. This prince of the royal house would represent his brother in diplomatic discussion with Aragon for the next several years.

While nothing came of the 1364 talks, negotiations continued in the next year when French envoys entered Aragon. Writing his ally, Carlos II, whom he conspired to destroy shortly before, Pere adamantly insisted that he had no intention of “concluding anything with the king of France,” and, in almost the same breath, expressed the wish that some diplomatic means could be reached to make up for “the great amount of

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159 ACA, Cancillería real, ff. 53v-54.

160 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, f. 82v.

161 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 111v-113v.
money we have spent and every day we spend on the frontier captains.”

Despite the effort expended on both sides in pursuit of some sort of diplomatic accord, France and Aragon had accomplished no diplomatic breakthrough by 1366 when Enrique’s initial conquest of Castile changed everything. Charles V threw in his lot his father’s mercenary captain, Enrique de Trastámara, while Edward III and his son, Edward, the Black Prince, associated themselves with the fugitive, Pedro the Cruel. Carlos II played both ends against the middle in hopes of fortuitous profit. Pere, another onlooker, maintained diplomatic relations with both England and France with the growing certitude that neither of these national bonds would do much to bring him the swath of promised border territory or a larger cut from a dismembered Castile.

Even in early 1367 when both France and England prepared to renew their conflict through Castilian surrogates, Pere was careful not to chose between them. In the late-summer of 1366, he sent ambassadors to Anjou determined to arrange an “alliance and friendship” with Charles that protect both of their realms. The laudable aim was to be accomplished by the formation of secret military plans that would leave Navarre “confused and deserted.” Though Enrique was already tied to France, Pere promised to act as mediator in establishing an unassailable triple alliance, the “great honor” of which no alignment of enemies would be able to overpower. When Perillós presented the

162 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 88r-v.

163 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, f. 134; Miret y Sans, “Négociations,” 92. The Aragonese procurators were Roger Bernat de Foix, viscount of Castellbó, and Francesc Perillós, viscount of Roda and royal chamerlain.

particulars of this pact in September, Charles and Anjou received a set of interlocked military plans ever bit as complicated as that to be negotiated with the Black Prince in the next year. “To destroy our enemies and recover that which was lost or destroyed,” Pere suggested a schedule of Aragonese and French troop-levels that would allow Enrique to wage successful offensives on both sides of the Pyrenees against Carlos.\footnote{ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 137r-v.} This scheme interested the land-hungry duke of Anjou and signaled a treaty with Anjou on September 29, 1366. In this instrument, he agreed to put up the required number of men-at-arms provided that the land conquered from Navarre would be incorporated within Aragonese or French territory “under the law of war or any other law.” To assure that the alliance would continue to operate after Navarre fell, Pere and his French allies agreed to aid each other in beating off enemy attacks and even presented a time-table for when this military support would be forthcoming.\footnote{ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, f. 135; Miret y Sans, “Négociations,” 97-100; Gutiérrez de Velasco, “Molina,” 266.}

After Enrique had suffered defeat at Nájera and then escaped into France to rebuild his military fortunes, Pere found his balancing act between England and France increasingly difficult to maintain. When in July, 1367, he began the process of renewing his relationship with Pedro and forging new ties with the Black Prince, the Aragonese sovereign could hardly conceal this new diplomatic direction. Instead, he openly admitted it, while assuring Charles
Donald J. Kagay

that he would do nothing to “damage the honor of the house of France.” Such assurances had become platitudes to French ambassadors who increasingly distrusted Pere. When he refused to make an agreement with Bertan du Guesclin for fear that this would cement the constable’s control over Molina, the Franco-Aragonese alliance was all-but defunct.

Even though their accord of 1366 still remained in effect, Pere found it difficult to get any concrete (especially monetary) advantage from his Gallic alliance. Throughout the summer and fall of 1367, he bitterly complained to Perillós that he could not build a diplomatic relationship on “generalities and [mere] words.” In spite of such venting to his ambassador about his eleven consecutive years of war and the desperate need to safeguard his lands from “foreign perils,” Pere could not jump-start the French “friendship.” Instead, he sought protection and potential territorial advantage by negotiating a truce with Pedro and broader agreements with the Black Prince. With no possibility of keeping secret his actions which tread dangerously close to the violation of the Franco-Aragonese alliance of 1366, he explained his official behavior to Perillós as a “deep desire to have peace... with all the persons of the world who wish it.”


169 Miret y Sans, “Négociations,” 120.

170 Ibid., 120.

Pere reinforced his role as an altruistic peacemaker on August 22, 1367 when he wrote Charles directly to announce his truce with Pedro, while urging the king not allow this action to blur “the memory of the good friendship... between us and our ruling houses.”

Despite his repeated efforts to resuscitate the Gallic alliance during the last months of 1367, the Aragonese ruler now found his connection to France obscured by Charles’s diplomatic bonds with Enrique. Thus when he asked both the French king and his brother to intercede with Enrique to delay Enrique’s return to Castile until the Aragonese truce with Pedro had expired, Pere found his request coolly received at the French court.

When it became clear to him that no international leverage was to be gained from a French alliance not worth the paper it was written on, Pere blamed, not himself, but Perillós whom he suspected of secretly favoring Enrique and conspiring with other Pyrenean and Aragonese nobles to expedite the return of Castile’s exiled king.

After Enrique had returned to his contested kingdom in February, 1368 and brutally eliminated his principal rival in little over a year, Pere’s drive to maintain peaceful relations with Charles while plotting the downfall of his ally, the triumphant Castilian king, was clearly stymied on both fronts. These plans were undermined by Enrique’s popularity among many of the Valencian population “who loved... [him] more than is necessary or that we would

\[^{172}\text{ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1217, f. 230; Miret y Sans, “Négociations,” 125.}\]

\[^{173}\text{ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1218, ff. 3, 10; Miret y Sans, “Négociations,” 126, 129.}\]

\[^{174}\text{Miret y Sans, “Négociations,” 130.}\]
wish." The French alliance with Aragon finally collapsed in 1373 when the principal Gallic negotiator, the duke of Aragon, announced that Pere’s claim to Castilian border land that had been in effect for seven years was rejected by both the French and Castilian monarchs since it damaged Enrique’s royal patrimony. Set adrift diplomatically by his erstwhile French ally, Pere could do little but watch from afar the gathering war clouds between France and England while protecting his own lands from the mercenary expeditions that spilled over into Iberia during the 1370s.

IX.

As the murky horizon of Iberian affairs cleared in 1369 with the death of Pedro at Montiel and Enrique’s survival as Castile’s only king, Pere continued to spin complex webs of diplomacy in hopes of profiting from his weakened neighbor. While surrounding Castile with the establishment of accords with England, France, Navarre, and Portugal that plotted Enrique’s downfall, the Aragonese king proved unwilling to engage in open warfare even when frontier violence intensified in the district around Molina. Instead, he relied on open negotiations with Enrique to gain territory promised him twice by 1366. To reaffirm their earlier “confederation and love,” Pere, on January 24, 1369, almost two months before

Montiel, assured his fellow monarch that he had always had great concern “for... [his] honor and advantage.”

By June 24, 1369 when Enrique had emerged victorious against Pedro, but not against his many supporters, Pere thought the time auspicious to re-open diplomatic relations with the former count who was now a king. The negotiations conducted for Aragon by the cagey military and diplomatic veteran, Archbishop Lope of Zaragoza, were hardly designed to implement equity between the parties, but instead sought to reestablish the former Aragonese-Castilian relationship in a way that rendered Pere’s position greater than that of Enrique’s. To personalize their mutual trust, a marriage was proposed between the Castilian princess, Leonore, and the Aragonese crown prince, Joan. The union would guarantee that the two kings “would remain friends,” and, for his part, Pere “would not wage nor consider waging it” against Enrique. This, of course, depended on the willingness of the Castilian ruler and his French supporter, Du Guesclin, to comply with earlier treaties and surrender Molina, Soria, and Almazan to Aragonese control. Despite the possibility for further dispute with these demands, Pere’s envoys assured the Castilian negotiators that Aragon’s sovereign “would honor all agreements... [with Enrique] in such a way that God and man... will have proof of it.”

This Aragonese pledge of good faith seemed to presage the diplomatic directions of

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179 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 167r-v.

180 Masiá de Ros, Relación, 1:331-32.

181 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1293, ff. 212-3v.
the two realms, at least for the next few months. After his ambassadors had worked with
Pere’s agents for most of the fall of 1369 to iron-out a new agreement, Enrique triumphantly
announced on December 17 that he had concluded “according to the custom of Spain” a
truce with Aragon until the upcoming feast of Pentecost.\footnote{Masiá de Ros, \textit{Relación}, 1:332.}
Despite this apparent end to their era of bad feelings, Pere still openly demonstrated his fear of Castilian attack
throughout 1369 and well into 1370. Warning his officials that “many [of Enrique’s]... men-at-arms from Castile and France arre threatening to enter into our realms,”\footnote{ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1228, ff. 66; R. 1230, ff. 6v, 21v-22; Valdeon Baruque, \textit{Enrique II}, 250, n. 134.} Pere sought to
surround his Castilian adversary with diplomatic accords that would severely weaken his
position while delivering the Castilian territory Aragon had fought so obstinately for so
many years to control.\footnote{Valdeon Baruque, \textit{Enrique II}, 250-51; Masiá de Ros, \textit{Relación}, 1:333.}

For his part, Enrique was well aware of Pere’s interlocking agreements with England,
Granada, Navarre, and Portugal and offset them with a skillful combination of military
threat and diplomatic openness. As a result, the Castilian king was able to dismantle his
rival’s plans almost as soon as they had been hatched. Thus, in 1370 and 1371 after
receiving backing with a renewed French alliance after 1368,\footnote{Suárez Fernández, \textit{Política internacional,” 62-64 (doc. 3).}} he used bluff and adept
negotiation to pull the new Portuguese king, Fernão, out of Pere’s circle and into the
mounting number of Castile’s allies. He did much the same thing with Carlos II of Navarre in October, 1371 when he bound their families in a marriage alliance that ultimately restored to Castile lands taken by Navarre in the past decade. He had already cleared the field for these diplomatic victories by concluding an eight-year truce with Muhammad V of Granada (1354-1359; 1362-1391) in the spring of 1372.

Faced with Enrique’s skill as a diplomat, Pere had no choice but to repeat in no uncertain terms his desire for peace and to use the Apostolic Legates named by Pope Gregory XI (1370-1378) to further this end. Pere appointed a distinguished delegation led by Bishop Romeo of Lerida and Ramón Almany de Cervelló that conferred for much of the summer of 1371 with a Castilian embassy headed by the Archbishop of Burgos and Alvar García de Albornoz. After a summer of high-level talks, peace was declared between Aragon and Castile at Toro on September 12 and then at Tortosa on October 13. The treaty was formally confirmed by both sides on December 8 in the Catalan city of Tortosa and in the Valencian town of Castelhbab. Besides the formal cessation of hostilities for parties who had been at war for sixteen years, the new agreement attempted first to pacify the Castilian-Aragonese frontiers by outlawing all “raids, reprisals, and damages” conducted or

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188 Suárez Fernández, “Política internacional,” 61-62 (doc. 2); O’Callaghan, History, 525.

189 Masiá de Ros, Relación, 1; 335-36; Valdeon Baruque, Enrique II, 267; Russell, English Intervention, 162-63.
allowed by either of the signatories. The unsafe nature of the common borderlands was to be addressed by both Pere and Enrique who guaranteed the safety of their merchants as well as the merchandise they transported. To make amends for confiscated goods or incarcerated traders, the principal architects of the pact, Cervelló and Albornoz, were appointed as commissioners who would use funds from tolls or “arbitrary exactions” (questiae) to pay off claims of merchants from either side of the border who had suffered losses during the war that had nothing directly to do with combat. To close the many gaps in borders from either direction, the treaty proposed the immediate confiscation of contraband of all types. This order included counterfeit “money of gold or silver,” much of which Pere had been guilty of putting into circulation over the past decade.\(^{190}\)

Even after Pere himself had received the new agreement from the hands of the Papal Legate at Alcañiz on January 4, 1372 and acted to “confirm, ratify, and strengthen” the agreement by formally swearing to it,\(^{191}\) “questions, claims, and debates” remained to be settled between the major Iberian states.\(^{192}\) Appointing new procurators on April 16, the Aragonese king told the Castilian ruler and the Apostolic Legate that he was willing to see all outstanding matters settled between themselves and their realms.\(^{193}\) After over a year of intermittent negotiations, the two monarchs announced a new agreement at Burgos on

\(^{190}\) ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1543, f. 81v; Masiá de Ros, Relación, 2:576-77 (doc. 251/15).

\(^{191}\) ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1543, f. 91.

\(^{192}\) Masiá de Ros, Relación, 1:336-37; 2:583-84 (doc. 253/18).

\(^{193}\) ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1543, ff. 95v-96; Masiá de Ros, Relación, 1:337; 2:584-85 (doc. 254/19).
September 7, 1373 and at Barcelona on September 26. To sort out the issues that unhappily bound them because of so many years of conflict, they issued yet another truce that would remain in effect until the feast of Pentecost in the following spring. The rulers would observe this agreement “with good faith and without deceit” and neither would allow any damage to be inflicted on the other’s territory during this period. A proven counterfeiter, Pere swore he would not allow the striking of money “on which the name or insignia of the lord king of Castile was imposed.” The new agreements were again sworn to by the royal agents while they held the Holy Gospels.¹⁹⁴

The differences between Aragon and Castile had proven so intractable that even given two major treaties after Montiel, Pere and Enrique demonstrated very little trust of each other in the years that followed. On December 21, 1373 (less than a year after their second proclamation of mutual friendship), Pere received alarming news. Through his much-vaunted spy network, the Aragonese king heard that his Castilian equivalent was seriously considering renouncing the throne in favor of his first-born, Juan. Why he would take such an unprecedented step is unclear. To Pere (who occasionally spoke paranoia with great fluency), the reason for such a move was obvious. It allowed the Castilian monarchy to wriggle out of the recent peace initiatives and to be free to launch yet another surprise attack on Pere’s exposed frontiers.¹⁹⁵ None of this fanciful Aragonese “intelligence,”


¹⁹⁵ ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1543, f. 122; Masiá de Ros, Relación, 1:341; 2: 595-96 (doc. 257/32).
Donald J. Kagay

however, proved true. In reality, Enrique himself still surrounded by enemies could no longer afford the luxury of international warfare. After solidifying his ties to Navarre and Portugal through marriage alliances, he confirmed the truce with Aragon on January 11, 1374.\textsuperscript{196}

Despite this bold move toward peace, Pere’s fear of surprise Castilian attacks was often born out by the lingering instability along the Aragonese and Valencian frontiers. In November, 1373, the Aragonese king wrote to Enrique (a person he wished as much “distinction, safety, and honor” as for himself) that a large number of armed men—surely mercenaries—had crossed out of Castile into Aragon. The raiders, led by a captain nicknamed Rochou, still held “a number of castles and villages...by fierce and traitorous means.” This clearly violated the peace accords Pere had signed with Enrique and demanded open action that would eventually send Aragonese raiding parties across the Castilian border in retaliation.\textsuperscript{197} Pere’s concern seemed to have some effect on the Castilian ruler who agreed to a thirty-day truce during the spring of 1375. During this period designed to defuse hostilities, however, Pere was forced to write to the Castilian crown prince, Juan, and impatiently point out that two of his Valencian merchants had been captured in Murcia by the count of Carrión, one of Enrique’s captains in the region. Since this occurred during the truce, Pere was forced to request the crown prince to free the traders

\textsuperscript{196}ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1543, f. 123; Masiá de Ros, \textit{Relación}, 1:340-41; 2:594-95; Suárez Fernández, “Política internacional,” 77-81 (doc. 5).

\textsuperscript{197}ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1543, f. 125v; Masiá de Ros, \textit{Relación}, 2:596-97 (doc. 258/35).
Disposable Alliances

with “their shipments and other goods.” Despite twice proclaiming peace between
themselves, direct diplomatic efforts, it seemed, were still necessary between the old
enemies.

In the midst of truces and complaints concerning their violation, Pere and Enrique
turned again to finding a viable peace that would eventually make amends for the “great
damages, evils, discords, and wars,” they had for so many years unleashed on themselves and
their lands. After intensive negotiations in the early spring of 1375, Castilian and Aragonese
negotiators produced yet another “perpetual peace and concord” between Enrique, his son,
Juan, and Pere and his son, Joan, as well as all succeeding Aragonese and Castilian rulers and
their realms now and in the future. This new friendship would allow nobles of the two
states to serve in the armies of either king and would see to the final settlement of all “suits,
pleas, claims, grants, oath and obligations of whatever manner or condition” between Pere,
Enrique, and their people. Because of the general nature of the treaty with Castile, Pere had
to explain his other pacts with England, France, Navarre, and Portugal, all of which were
openly or covertly inimical to Castile. Pere attempted to explain away these agreements,
saying that each was designed to establish peace, “a thing that will be pleasing to God, will
desire for public faith, and will be suitable for the public good.”

The general treaty that was confirmed in the monastery of San Francisco at Almazan

198ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1543, ff. 148v; Masiá de Ros, Relación, 2:605-6 (doc. 260/37).

Aragonese envoys were Ramón Almany de Cervelló, Dalmacio de Muro, Ramon de Cervera, doctor of laws.
The Castilian envoys were Bishop Gutierre of Palencia and Bishop Martin of Plascencia.
Donald J. Kagay

on April 12, 1375 and in the royal palace at Soria on June 20, was fulfilled in personal terms
with the betrothal of Pere’s seventeen-year-old daughter, Leonore, with Enrique’s fifteen-
year-old son, Juan. The terms of this nuptial agreement were generous to both sides.
Leonore, characterized by her father as “a most beautiful creature,” brought a dowry of
200,000 florins and received as a gift from the groom’s family full control of the Castilian
towns of Almazan and Atienza, sites that her father had been granted by Enrique as early as
1366.

At the heart of this new era of amity between Aragon and Castile was Pere’s drive to
realize the many territorial promises Enrique had made him from 1363 onward. To clarify
this extremely complex history of Castilian promises made but never kept, the father of the
new bride in March, 1378 had a long list of Enrique’s grants to him for the past fifteen years
drawn up. Whether this was a prelude to litigation concerning the undelivered land or not, it
showed clearly that the Castilian king had pledged more to his intermittent Aragonese ally
over the years than he had “given to the city of Seville.”

Despite these repeated promises, Enrique proved unwilling to make good his word even after 1366 when he had the power to
do so. Instead, as in the 1375 accord, he began to promise the payment of revenues that


201 ACA, Cancillería real. R. 1543, ff. 171-77. This marriage was first agreed to in 1366 at Burgos immediately
after Enrique was crowned Castilian king. Pere had delayed the betrothal because of Enrique’s failure to turn
over the territories he had promised his prospective father-in-law before his first invasion of Castile. Juan had
apparently fallen in love with Leonore during his stay at the Aragonese court in the first year of the Castilian
civil war. When Enrique again insisted that the nuptials take place in 1375, Pere resisted, but “weighed down
by evils and troubles and toils”, finally gave in [Pere III, 2:578-83, 587-91 (VI:61-64; Appendix:1-3).

202 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1543, f. 178v; Masiá de Ros, Relación, 1:342-43.
would eventually compensate Pere for the loss of the territory.\textsuperscript{203} 

The granted land that stood at the core of their relationship was the strategically placed fortress/town of Molina which lays due south of Calatayud. With the death of Pedro in 1369, Enrique had rewarded his French captain, Bertran du Guesclin, with the town and several other neighboring towns.\textsuperscript{204} Angered at the prospect of being turned over to the rule of a foreigner, Molina’s ruling council voted to surrender their town to Aragonese control.\textsuperscript{205} Putting Molina under the command of local captain, Diego García de Vera, Pere spent the next several years attempting to safeguard the outpost from Castilian or French attack.\textsuperscript{206} By 1375, the Aragonese king, having removed García de Vera from power and looking to escape from the responsibility of the expensive Castilian enclave, deeded Molina back to Enrique after guaranteeing the personal safety and fortunes of the town residents who preferred to cross the border to make a new life in Aragon. The foreign stumbling block in these development, Du Guesclin, was removed in the early 1370s when the French constable sold his rights to Molina back to Enrique and those to Valencian holdings back to Pere.\textsuperscript{207}

\textsuperscript{203} ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1543, ff. 158r-v.

\textsuperscript{204} Vernier, \textit{Flower}, 145-46, 154.

\textsuperscript{205} Gutiérrez de Velasco, “Molina,” 82-83.

\textsuperscript{206} Ibid., 88-90, 94-95, 115; ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1551, ff. 73v-74.

\textsuperscript{207} ACA, Cancillería real, ff. 138r-v, 142v-44; Gutiérrez de Velasco, “Molina,” 98, 122-25; Vernier, \textit{Flower}, 154; O’Callaghan, \textit{History}, 525.
The pressure that had brought Pere to the bargaining table in 1375 moved him in succeeding years to attempt a final solution concerning Aragonese and Castilian merchants and their freedom of movement within the two states. Addressing this weighty issue on April 30, 1378, Pere re-stated general principles of Aragonese-Castilian trade laid out in the treaty of 1375. He declared that Aragonese and Valencian merchants should be safe in carrying out business ventures in Castile and the same should be true for Castilians trading in the Crown of Aragon. He also re-affirmed for his own people the right of salvage in regard to Castilian ships sinking off the Valencian or Catalan littoral. If Castilian merchants managed to off-load their cargoes from such vessels, they were free to sell their goods within his lands once they had paid the requisite impost. If ecclesiastical institutions, Aragonese or Castilian, entered into such international business for profit, they also had to pay all the applicable tolls. If they engaged in trade only to support their communities, however, their trade would be free of taxes within his realms. Disputes emanating from “frauds and scandals” that accompanied trade across Iberian borders would use the letter of the 1375 treaty as a guide for rendering judgement in such cases.208 In theory, this economic pacification on international frontiers was an ingenious solution, but did not always function as intended by the peacemakers. Thus on July 15, 1378, Pere had to write one of his commissioners at Valencia instructing him to reimburse from the fund fed by revenues drawn from imposts on foreign trade two of his Valencian merchants who had recently suffered damages in Castile. He assured his official that these outlays would be duly made up

208 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1543, f. 180v.
Disposable Alliances

by the Castilian ruler, but there is no record they ever were.\(^{209}\) Peace had come to the
monarchs of Aragon and Castile, but it would apparently take a little longer to descend on
their frontiers

X.

The middle decades of the fourteenth century marked some of the most turbulent
phases in a relationship between Castile and the Crown of Aragon that had demonstrated its
violent nature on several occasions in the previous century.\(^{210}\) When these social and
diplomatic fault zones led to wars between the two states unprecedented in its ruthlessness
and brutality, the participants could hardly imagine how far-flung their conflict would grow.
The Crown of Aragon, a set of states that had completed its reconquest endeavors in the
late-thirteenth century and then had become a player in the Mediterranean was drawn back
into peninsular affairs in an attempt to win the “middle ground” that surrounded the much-
contested kingdom of Murcia.\(^{211}\) Castile, the last of Iberia’s reconquest powers, became
increasingly active in the Mediterranean by allying themselves with Aragon’s principal rivals,
the Angevins and Genoese.\(^{212}\) When two of Spain’s principal states found themselves

\(^{209}\) ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1543, f. 181.

\(^{210}\) For a closely documented review of Aragonese-Castilian relations in the later thirteenth century, see Robert
I. Burns, S.J., “Warrior Neighbors: Alfonso el Sabio and Crusader Valencia: An Archival Case Study in His

\(^{211}\) Josep-David Garrido i Valls, \textit{La conquesta del sud Valencià i Múrcia per Jaume II} (Barcelona, 2002).

\(^{212}\) Steven A. Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese 958-1528} (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996), 179; David Abulafia, \textit{The
Western Mediterranean Kingdoms 1200-1500: The Struggle for Dominion} (London, 1997), 118, 128; Suárez Fernández,
enmeshed in conflict in 1356, Aragonese and Castilian diplomatic aims seemed to overlap. Castile fought bitterly to conquer long stretches of the Peninsula’s Mediterranean litoral and its hinterland while Aragon did its best to remain in the top orbit of Spanish realms.

Throughout the first decade of the War of the Two Pedros, the conflict was a purely Iberian affair that pitted an accomplished warrior, Pedro I, against a cautious and wily political schemer, Pere III. When the Aragonese ruler found a talented and popular cat’s paw in the person of Pedro’s half-brother, Enrique de Trastámara, the Aragonese-Castilian conflict morphed into a bloody fight for dominance between siblings. While the war for Castilian control seemed destined to become a principally domestic affair, it soon drew the involvement of other Iberian powers and of the two heavy weights of the Hundred Years War, England and France. This new type of kaleidoscopic international conflict that repeatedly spilled over the Pyrenees and surged over the borders of Iberian states seemingly fitted Pere III more than did the ten years of dogged frontier warfare he had just endured. Now he could act to ring Castile with allies whose territorial greed equaled his own. If the struggle between Pedro and Enrique settled into a equally matched fight that took years to conclude, Pere, much more of a diplomat than a soldier, could entertain high hopes of gaining large segments of Castilian territory while hamstringing his principal Iberian rival. He would soon find these hopes shattered by Enrique’s record as a skillful commander who eventually sent his half-brother to an early grave and as an efficient negotiator who methodically broke down the confederation of powers surrounding him. In the end, Pere’s diplomatic endeavors that were laid out in such ambitious terms proved to little more than
Disposable Alliances

“generalities and [mere] words.”213 Enrique’s triumph’s, on the other hand, came about from a much simpler conduct of both warfare and diplomacy brought about by the definition and attainment of much simpler goals.

213 See note 167.